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Do aesthetics relate with brands? In this work, we try to find out if brands interfere with aesthetics, 
and we use experimental aesthetics in trying to develop a new brand. The brand will apply to the 
furniture of Álvaro Siza, a famous Portuguese architect, and our concern was consumer’s 
assessment of it. We confront his design with the one of other relevant authors, and analyse how 
consumer’s judgement varies in face of some basic factors. Our approach is market oriented, 
explores cultural differences, uses WMDS - Weighted Multidimensional Scaling, and we believe it 
brought us a preliminary, but fundamental understanding of consumers’ opinion, as well as some 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
In marketing, we want our products or services (physical attributes, characteristics, technology, etc.) 
to perfectly match consumer’s characteristics (personality, behaviour, etc.), given a wide and 
constantly changing array of social phenomena (markets, prices, fashion, laws, etc.). Indeed a 
complex list of issues to master, to which we must add those coming from the communication 
process between all actors involved.   
We want to facilitate trade, to sell, to please consumers, to understand them, and we realised, a long 
time ago, that brands are useful mechanisms to do it. Yet, in its broad sense, we have not invented 1 
brands, nor brands have factual existence. We have discovered peculiar human phenomena, so useful 
for us (if producers) as for others (if consumers), found out that (many times) it “accept” our 
interference - for the best and for the worst - and named “the whole” of it. Such interference, 
however, is what builds difference(s) on the way consumers relates with objects and that we certainly 
need to master.  
When can we say, then, that we are facing a brand, and what happens when we do want to 
interfere, as when we wish to develop a new brand? The number of questions involved, and of 
possible answers, is high, but we can only take some at a time.  
In this work, I try to model a consumer basic experience, the one that usually happens when he 
visualises a product and commonly named as “aesthetic”, and I attempt to consider how it relates 
with the concept of brand. “The aesthetic” of a product often starts consumer’s judgement about it 
although, sometimes, previous information is present. Also frequently it stays, long after that, as a 
permanent mean of appraisal. However, and due to the enormous amount of differences we can 
find among people, we can raise difficult questions about it: Does it rests upon underlying rules? 
Which ones are they? How common are they? What is their relative importance? Do they depend 
                                                 
1 Throughout this work the following conventions will be used: 
      - Italics (and occasionally underlining) in emphasis. 
      - Brackets in simplified and metaphorical words, or expressions. 
      - Brackets and Italics in citations. 
      - Capitalised words in working concepts.  
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on context, for instance additional information? How they vary among individuals, whether 
geographically, with gender, age, etc? A vast universe of causes may have something to do with 
these questions, and marketing actions are probably among it. Thus, knowing something about this 
kind of judgements, and about its consistency among individuals and/or situations, can probably 
helps us to determine, or to change, how must we understand that product and, in particular, if 
(and how) a brand applies to it. 
In trying to answer this, I use a simple approach, one that merely recognises that people differ in 
reality appraisal, not only in response bias but also in the perceptual or cognitive processes that 
generate the responses, as well as in affective processes involved. I start my questions considering 
two fields of inquiry: aesthetics and consumer behaviour. Later on, I consider the influence of 
another discipline: neural-biology. Perspectives differ, of course, but I believe that human 
behaviour necessarily crosses them all, and that brands in particular are better understood if we 
consider “the aesthetic” of it. In Chapter 1, then, I carry on this analysis, summarising main goals of 
this work (item 1.1), revisiting important perspectives on each field (items 1.2 and 1.4.1), and noting 
some unavoidable interference’s between them (items 1.3 and 1.4.2). The order in presentation 
gradually emphasises “the aesthetic” as underlying much of all consumer behaviour.   
In Chapter 2, then, I attempt the theoretic question of how to do it e.g., how to model such 
judgements, but a word of caution is useful: models often give us a Cartesian view of the world, but 
hardly the world is so, human minds in particular. We use models when too much complexity 
prevent us from using other means, what is being studied is inaccessible to our senses, we face a 
conceptually difficult question, or we find it puzzling (POOLE, 1995, p99). Still, although I believe 
that both “the aesthetic” and brands follow some of these rules, I also think that models can help 
us to “grasp” a piece of the true existing in the world we inhabit, even if a small one.  
As there is no such thing as a consensus about what qualifies as “aesthetic”, I take it on its sense of 
Affect. I consider “the aesthetic” as everything that consumers may like (or dislike) when they see an 
object, how much “good” or “bad” is what they feel about it, how much they are pleased (or not) by 
it, whatever they understand or think as deserving to be enjoyed (or not) on it. Taste 2 would be a 
similar concept and perhaps Attitude too. I see emotions and feelings as a “common ground” 
between fields, something that allows us to talk about what qualifies as aesthetic, as well as to 
                                                 
2 In the broad sense of our ability to enjoy beauty in objects, and to form judgments about it. 
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recognise a brand, because although we can say many more things about these concepts I can’t 
imagine, both, without emotions and feelings involved. Accordingly, I adopt a perspective coming 
from neural-biologic science (items 2.1 and 2.2), which attributes to emotions and feelings a 
fundamental role on conscience. 
In my view, however, to effectively address Affect we need to account, also, for consumer’s 
Perception, because they are intimately connected. Therefore, in characterising “the aesthetic” 
through consumer’s judgements of value, I believe we need to (simultaneously) model their judgements of 
fact, so that we reasonably account for context. In addition, as I am adopting a marketing approach, 
my concern is to find out if those judgements obey to some underlying “structure”, or pattern, that 
can facilitate further actions to understand, and bring value, to consumers. 
Furthermore, I consider that relations between people and objects may involve “levels” we can 
typify in the iconic, the indexing and the symbolic mode(s) of reference. Now, to be effective marketing 
actions usually introduce a “dynamic” over such modes of reference, which led me to question 
whether those judgements also reflect it. Accordingly, my understanding was that if judgement’s 
(eventual) pattern is not stable, across different modes of reference, aesthetic judgements may be 
conveying differences which are themselves (part of) the brand, and which we may probably use – 
subsequently – to develop it (item 2.3).  
I attempt the empirical question in Chapter 3. Accepting an opportunity initially brought up by 
ICEP 3, and related with the Portuguese foreign image, I develop an exploratory approach, market 
research oriented, about a (possible) new brand in the field of furniture design: a brand “by Álvaro 
Siza”, the prominent Portuguese architect awarded in 1992 with the prestigious “Pritzker Prize” 4. 
Design is inseparable form aesthetic judgements, and as proliferation of styles, in contemporary 
society, stresses object’s form and symbolism to consumers, my attempt deals, essentially, with the 
following complementary questions: 
- To identify common factors, criteria, or simplifying rules, that may come into play when 
consumers evaluate different styles of well-known objects, and which I presume can structure 
their appraisal of it; in other words, if consumers agree on something. 
- To identify if differences exist, among them, concerning the way they understand and/or 
                                                 
3 ICEP – Investments, Commerce and Tourism of Portugal (Oporto Delegation): 1998 
4 The Hyatt Foundation, USA, annually grants the Pritzker Prize, usually considered as the Nobel Prize of architecture.  
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evaluate those objects, as well as if symbolism is already relevant to such appraisal. Differently 
stated, how they diverge. 
The goal of helping to develop a “by Siza” brand is present, of course, and as chances of bringing 
value to consumers increase if one can previously know their opinion, knowledge about such a 
structure would help because it could point us “ways”, or favourable “paths”, to reinforce the value 
consumers (already) attribute to Siza objects. I use, then, a sample of people living in four different 
countries, interviewed with the help of ICEP foreign delegates, to test concepts and methodology. 
I conceived the approach as a preliminary step, or exploratory initiative, introducing a subsequent 
full market research on the part of those that are, or will be, managing such brand; therefore, it has 
a limited scope. Still, I believe it led to interesting results, justifying further levels of research.  
In Chapter 4, I present and discuss my findings. Characterising consumer’s answers, whether 
individually or at an aggregated level, is not the same as justifying; rather, it is a previous condition 
towards such eventual goal(s) and, as discussed, results suggest: 
- An interesting pattern in consumer’s answers, unexpectedly stable among countries (and 
cultures), possibly reflecting “tendencies of taste”, and probably useful for marketing purposes. 
- The existence of some differences, in judgements, that may reflect the influence of symbolism, 
whether deliberately induced or not, but fairly allowing us to admit a relation between “the 
aesthetic” and brands. 
- A (relatively) weak evaluation of Siza objects, and name, that calls for further qualification, 
particularly on some of the markets involved. Accordingly, my suggestion to whoever will 
manage the brand is that he considers the use of one, or more, expanded versions of this survey 
to do it. 
Finally, I recall here that understanding how people perceive and affectively relate with objects may 
be useful, but it remains, nevertheless, a simplified tool (or artifice) to describe how they cope, in 
fact, with reality. Still, I believe aesthetics may give a stronger contribution to marketing than the 
one we may inadvertently consider, at a first glance. 
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C h a p t e r  1  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 – Beyond paradigms. 
 
Brands usually involve “the aesthetic”, and many times take it as central to the way consumers 
develop its personal image of product(s), service(s), or the organisation itself. In fact, “the 
aesthetic” concerns to relations between an object 5 characterisation and subject’s experience of it, 
and, if we note, this is – at least in part - what brands are about. Thus, characteristics like the 
product form 6, or its symbolism, which otherwise people would naturally understand as “aesthetic”, 
are also some of the characteristics they may, and indeed do attribute to brands.  
 “The aesthetic” systematically pervades our lived experience that is, knowledge we build over a wide 
array of objects, facts, or situations, and which allows us basic skills about how to live and how to 
do. From that perspective, then, it is part of our involuntary knowledge, because it pervades our 
common sense, which is non-critical knowledge (POPPER, 1988, quoted in NÓBREGA e 
MARQUES, 1997, p11). In addition, although we continuously transcend this experience through 
critic reasoning and abstractions, which are both characteristics of our thought experience, we still 
recognise “the aesthetic” as present. In fact, “the aesthetic” involves what we value, and although 
we need real objects, facts or situations to understand values (MORENTE, quoted in NÓBREGA 
e MARQUES, 1997, p85), these do not exist as real things; they are virtual and exist only in our 
mind. From objects, then, we can say they are e.g., they exist, but from values - as with “the 
aesthetic” - we can only say they value (FRONDIZI, quoted in NÓBREGA e MARQUES, 1997, 
p85).  
Brands also presuppose myths, as well as they presuppose human action, too. Indeed, myths 
                                                 
5 In its broad sense of thing, fact or situation. 
6 Aggregated concept representing here, for instance, shape, scale, tempo, proportion, materials, colour, reflectiveness, ornamentation 
or texture, etc. 
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involve a type of speech 7 “…made of material which has already been worked on so as to make it suitable for 
communication…” and which is “…not defined by the object of its message, but by the way in which it utters this 
message…”(BARTHES, 1957, p1-2), and brands certainly involve myths. Human action, in turn, 
translates and presupposes choices, determined by will and founded in values that regulate it 
(NÓBREGA e MARQUES, 1997, p70), and brands necessarily imply, and rely, over specific 
patterns of it.  
More important, however, brands show us that myths influence human action. We may probably 
think, or describe such influence in many different ways, but if we undoubtedly detect “the 
aesthetic” as pervading our understanding of brands, it would be interesting to know if it involves 
“the aesthetic” too. Not surprisingly then, the more we recognise that a myth emphasises, or relies, 
on what people may eventually see as “aesthetic”, the more we need to know if, who and where, share 
whatever value they find on it, so that we characterise the relation; unless, of course, our concern is 
not marketing. 
An example, less extreme than it may appears, can help: 
- Can we brand art objects, or do we take it as art due - precisely - to an implicit brand? 
This is, in fact, a complex question. Brands are essentially interesting if at the eyes of consumers 
they add value to products involved, otherwise we can question it. If we proceed with such 
reasoning, however, and try to cope with “the aesthetic”, an additional difficulty appears that 
almost introduces the paradox of knowing how to qualify a qualifier. Indeed, instead of qualifying 
something, as usual, “the aesthetic” become the something to be “qualified”, in order to define, firstly, 
consumer’s point of view e.g., inherently existent value, and secondly, the role being played by the 
brand e.g., which value is being added by the brand. In other words, on one side emphasising 
aesthetics questions, or accepting to be contingent on it, necessarily involves to deal with object’s 
ambiguous characteristics, as well as to cope with pervasive consumer’s experiences, most of the 
times blended in a way almost impossible to untangle. On the other side, presuming that 
consumers inherently systematise “the aesthetic”, and that we can even find how they do it, we still 
remain with the question of what is being the role of the brand, or what worthies to be taken as 
such. Special difficulties include: 
- The possibility of characterising consumers, regarding how they understand “the aesthetic” in 
                                                 




- How to understand, use, or even redefine such characterisation as part of a brand. 
Thus, how do aesthetics relate with brands? 
 
1.2 – Some notes about Brands. 
 
Academic wisdom has consistently considered, in this last decade, the need to conceptualise brands 
as effects in consumer's mind and, accordingly, on their behaviour and in the functioning of the 
marketplace. Although skills, know-how, legal, communicational, relational or organisational issues 
are certainly recognised as fundamental parts of the brand concept, common sense notes that 
without these effects, simple or complex, there are no brands. Naturally, as perspectives about 
brands differ, definitions about these effects and its relationships differ too. As significant 
examples, all certainly valid: 
- Under the concept of Brand Identity (KAPFERER, 1991, p37-41), components considered are 
the Physical one (characteristics of the product or service), brand Personality (name, symbol, 
communication characteristics), Culture (adopted system of values), Relations (between brand 
and consumer's associations), Reflex (semantic result of consumer's behaviour) and Mental 
Result (consumer's personality adaptation). Effects are here mostly emphasised, then, in half of 
these components: Relations, Reflex and Mental Result. 
- Under the concept of Brand Equity (AAKER, 1991, p17), components considered are, instead, 
consumer's Loyalty, name Awareness, perceived Quality, brand Associations, and other Assets 
(competitive advantages of the brand “owner”). Here, in turn, considered effects spread 
between most of the components used. 
- In a similar approach, defined as Customer-Based Brand Equity (KELLER, 1993, p8; 1998, 
p45-50), the focus goes to consumer's knowledge and it includes the Awareness (Recall and 
Recognition) and the Image (Associations) components, both effects in consumer's mind. 
- In a semiotic perspective, Semprini (1992, p39-44), structure brand components as 
Environment (Contexts: social, cultural, legal, economical, political, market, etc.), Production 
Encyclopaedia (Culture, Objectives and Plans, Communication Mix, understandings of 
contexts, etc), and Reception Encyclopaedia (Attitudes, Motivations, Perceptions, 
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Interpretations, Practices, etc.), so that it systematically produce meaning. In a sense, effects are 
here a goal under the Reception Encyclopaedia component.  
- Again, under a semiotic perspective Mollerup (1997, in LENCASTRE, 1999, p15-16) defines 
brands as Signs (name, logo…), Objects (product, organisation, mission…) and Effects 
(consumer's image). 
With brands substantively recognised as effects in consumers, “…something that (ultimately) resides in 
the minds of consumers…” (KELLER, 1998,p10), the emphasis shifts to consumers, and how they 
relate themselves with environment, which translates, then, in accepting that consumer's “own” the 
brand (SOUTHGATE, 1994, p20), although what exactly is meant by that remains complex to 
unify. 
Brands address the whole relation “person vs. object”, and contemporary trends in theory, coming 
from consumer behaviour discipline, emphasise how people “arrive” to meaning (PINSON and 
JOLIBERT, 1998). However, we can also consider what people value and, accordingly, emphasise 
value when we address brands. In particular, consumers can adopt an aesthetic point of view, and 
this “shift” of perspective seems to be possible, only, if we do not consider value as a consequence 
of meaning, or the inverse, but recognise both situations as possible and, most of the times, 
simultaneous, because both are inherent conditions of human conscience. In fact, we constantly 
seem to prefer rather then to just know e.g., we have “…the faculty of preferring, be it to perceive in all 
things an halo that qualify them as good, bad, better, worst…which is, perhaps, an universal function of all living 
being”(MORENTE, in NÓBREGA e MARQUES, 1997, p96). Therefore, “…it is (…) very likely that, 
with or without its conscience, all living being contemplate its world much under the species of the preferable than under 
the species of the strict being” (Ibiden, p96). It seems, then, that we continuously engage ourselves in 
something which “…breaks with the indifference that places all things and all events at the same level of 
(non)significance” (NÓBREGA e MARQUES, 1997, p96) e.g., we constantly value everything, be it 
real or imagined. 
Keller points out the interest of the brand equity concept in representing (a fairly consensus about) 
“…effects uniquely attributable to the brand” (1988, p42) e.g., “…added value endowed to a product as a result of 
past investments in the marketing for the brand” (Ibiden, p44). He also defines a brand as a product or 
service, but “…one that adds other dimensions to differentiate it in some way from other products designed to satisfy 
the same need” (Ibiden, p4). Conciliating these quotations implies, then, that past (marketing) actions 
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can bring, specifically, unique value to a product or service, hence creating additional dimensions 
that allow it to be different e.g., to become a brand. Consequently, both an identity and a causal 
relation appear: the brand is those differences (effects e.g., values) caused or, perhaps better, reinforced 
by (marketing) actions, but even so the concept remains pervasive. In fact, even the most refined 
concept remains a concept and there is no vanishing point at which it becomes a “percept” 
(ISENBERG, 1949, p6); we usefully address the idea of it, or its results, not itself as a concrete 
instance. Still, we must recognise at least some of these effects to render a critical verdict, although 
considerable latitude remains. 
Thus, we can consider that “the key to branding is that consumers perceive differences (…) in a product category” 
(KELLER, 1998, p10, emphasis added), but as we can also think that differences are usefulness if 
they are not valued, we can adopt the following premises: 
 
P1. Brands are the expression of a (differential) value, as seen from consumers’ point of view. 
 
P2. Effective marketing actions e.g., actions that cause brands, presuppose we conceive and 
advertise a product in face of, and towards consumer’s taste and preferences (values). 
  
1.3 – The presence of “the aesthetic”. 
 
Products or services also involve “the aesthetic”, and through times we have always rely on it when 
making our choices. Indeed, now as always, many times products and services are essentially valued 
because of it. While it is possible to argue, in such cases, that whether we are facing a different 
question, one that leaves the brand field to enter the art(s) one or, instead, that these are only 
particular situations, it is no less true that nowadays such boundaries have become complex to 
define. In actual “hyper-choice” society, as Semprini calls it (1995, p23), it is not unusual that a 
differential value can hardly be find, in many cases, unless “the aesthetic” can trigger it, and we may 
illustrate it as follow:  
Firstly consider the concept of product form, as jointly representing such elements as, for instance, 
shape, scale, tempo, proportion, materials, colour, reflectiveness, ornamentation or texture e.g., 
elements which are chosen and blended into a whole by designers in product conception (BLOCH, 
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1995, p17). Contemporary (expected or imposed) high standards, or constrains, concerning for 
instance performance, ergonomics, production, costs, or regulatory and legal issues, led Design to 
achieve an widespread status of mandatory prerequisite, just to gain market presence. But then, 
while this is certainly a remarkable evolution, chances that (consumers) choice relies over form, in 
detriment of functional or utilitarian characteristic, increased, because the latter has (almost) turned 
into an “acquired presuppose” to consumers. Consequently, and as a minimum, form probably 
interferes in the product (or service) evaluation; it may frequently represents, however, a significant 
part of consumer’s value, if not the crucial one.  
Secondly, consider another situation, perhaps less (physically) product-related but also common 
nowadays, of brands built over marks of well-known names (the French word griffe being perhaps a 
better one…). Griffe(s) refer to “…creation. Its universe of reference is art, its production mode the hand, its 
obsession…to make…the invincible perfect work…”(KAPFERRER, 1991, p27) and, inevitably, “the 
aesthetic” plays a central role, here. Whether we consider that the step from a griffe to a brand needs 
the serial production, and the factory (Ibiden, 1991, p27), or, instead, that a griffe is already a more 
or less developed phase of a brand, in such step “the aesthetic” cannot decrease. It must continue, 
indeed, as a relevant part of (all possible) consumer’s value, and as so it is critic.  
Finally, the use of “the aesthetic” is extensive in persuasive brand communications. As an intimate 
connection seems to exist between “the aesthetic” and our emotions and feelings, and the latter 
have been shown to be significant determinants of various consumer behaviour (NYER, 1997, 
p296), advertising places heavy emphasis over “the aesthetic” in trying to shape consumer’s product 
and services appraisal. Indeed, from a consumer’s point of view, beyond the (conscious or 
unconscious) incidence of “the aesthetic” on products and services appraisal, we even expect 
sometimes advertising to be, itself, “aesthetically” appealing, otherwise we tend to avoid it. 
Thus, another relevant premise is that: 
 
P3. Marketing has pushed forward, not backwards, the importance of “the aesthetic”.  
 
1.4 – Some notes about “the aesthetic”. 
 
Every consumption situation involves “the aesthetic”, yet it is difficult to specify where it begins or 
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ends. In fact, when considered as “aesthetic”, both the properties of objects or the experience of 
individuals are very difficult to clarify, even when, for instance, we perfectly recognise a style or 
identify historical or cultural elements as important in enjoying a given object, and the subject has 
always been a matter of debate, as well as of voluminous literature.  
We can understand “the aesthetic” in two different senses, strongly connected of course, but 
different nevertheless: as a general theory about what we feel, and as a theory of art (NÓBREGA e 
MARQUES, 1997, p114). Here we take the former as a consumer behaviour issue, addressable in 
light of neurobiological science, and thus a problem of “experimental aesthetics”; the later we take 
as a philosophic subject. We begin by the second of these senses, because it helps to understand the 
first and to establish some grounds in studying it.   
 
1.4.1 – “The aesthetic” as a philosophical subject. 
 
We can trace inquiry roots about what is, or qualifies as “aesthetic”, back to Plato and his 
archetypes of the beautiful, the true and the good, but aesthetics as a discipline is only about two 
centuries old (NÓBREGA e MARQUES, 1997, p110; STRATI, 1992, p568). The German 
philosopher Alexander Baumgarten developed the term and the discipline, in the 18th century, 
building on the Greek concepts “aisthétiké” (which means “relative to sensation”) and “aisthanestai” 
(the verb “to perceive”) (NÓBREGA e MARQUES, 1997, p110; SCHMITT and SIMONSON, 
1998, p39).  
Attempting to describe here the evolution of the discipline would be, even if a possible task, to 
abandon a reasonable scope for this work. Further, as in this field “…there are no conclusive definitions 
or definitive conclusions” (NÓBREGA e MARQUES, 1997, p118), if we look for the meaning of “the 
aesthetic” hardly we avoid the problem of “oscillating” between, on one side, the analysis of our 
own experience and, on another, the analysis of what, or where, we experiment it (STRATI, 1992, 
p568).   
It seems unavoidable, however, to mention some ideas coming from analytic perspectives, and for 
three different reasons. Firstly, because this philosophical tradition tends to see aesthetics as a 
“second-order discourse”, that clarifies concepts of art critics and historians (BENDER and 
BLOCKER, 1993, p69). Secondly, because compared with postmodernist positions, the analytic 
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tradition reveals a higher degree of optimism toward the recovery of at least some form of rational 
objectivity in the discussion of art (Ibiden, 1993, p421). Thirdly, because these arguments seem to 
be necessary conditions in conciliating “the aesthetic” with marketing. 
Tumas-Serna (1993, p80) traces the origin of modern aesthetics to the formalisation of theories of 
taste and beauty in Kant's Critique of Judgement, and, in Kant, aesthetic judgements possess a kind of 
universality, but not the universality of a scientific law. Rather, it is we who think our judgements of 
the beautiful should have force or efficacy for others (BENDER and BLOCKER, 1993, p172). For 
Kant, aesthetic judgements relate to the “free play” of our cognitive capacities, the interplay of 
subjective faculties detached from any concept at all and applied to object form. As so there cannot 
be anything like a deductive science of aesthetic judgements, because these are completely 
non-cognitive (Ibiden, 1993, p172): “…aesthetic judgement is unique of its kind and gives absolutely no 
cognition (not even a confused cognition) of the object; this is only supplied by a logical judgement) (KANT, 1951 
translation, p10).  
Thinkers that would follow him, from Shopenhauer to Hegel or Nietzsche, established art as a 
legitimate concern of philosophy (TUMAS-SERNA, 1993, p81), and in early twentieth century 
Benedetto Croce, and Clive Bell, were among the idealists that shaped the development of relevant 
topics in the discipline (BENDER and BLOCKER, 1993, p123; TUMAS-SERNA, 1993, p81; 
TEIXEIRA, 1999, p2). In Croce, for instance, the emphasis had gone to what he called “lyrical 
intuition”, which he thought converted chaotic feelings into clear intuition. As for Croce there was 
an identity between intuition an expression, the difference between an emotional sensation and a 
lyrical intuition was that only the later had been given form that is, had been expressed (BENDER 
and BLOCKER, 1993, p123). For Bell, instead, not only there was a peculiar emotion known as 
aesthetic emotion as, also, only artworks provoked that emotion; further still, all artworks had in 
common what he called “significant form” (TEIXEIRA, 1999, p2). 
Until the mid-twentieth century, aesthetics stayed approximately definable, more narrowly than it 
can be today, as the investigation of the aesthetic experience and its differences from other sorts of 
experience. Philosophical answers usually considered that aesthetic experience involved Disinterestedness, 
Detachment, and Distance  - the “3D’s”- and the analytic perspective emerges, in part, as a reaction to 
this (BENDER and BLOCKER, 1993, p367). Broadly, however, it is a consequence of the analytic 
approach to philosophy introduced by Moore and Russell, and continued by Wittgenstein and 
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others (SHUSTERMAN, 1987, p2).  
Some agreement also exists concerning its evolution with the end of World War II (BENDER and 
BLOCKER, 1993, p2). The “goal” in the field was, at the time, “…to be rid of the romanticism, idealism, 
essentialism (…) of the earlier half century” (Ibiden, 1993, p2), and the self sustaining momentum 
appeared when “…the tools of close logical and conceptual analysis were (…) implemented in the elimination of 
three major sources of (…) field’s dreariness” (Ibiden, quoting SILVERS, 1987): 
- Previous and prominent ideas in the field, considered “obscure” and “confused”. 
- The practice of overgeneralizations based on particular features of certain aesthetic experiences. 
- The unfounded presupposition that art shares an important essence, despite of its variety. 
Under such evolution, we can regard Susanne Langer as a transitional figure of the 50s, associated 
both with the older, pre-analytic aesthetics, and with early analytic movements (BENDER and 
BLOCKER, 1993, p124). Langer developed a theory of expression known as “iconic 
isomorphism”, based on isomorphic relations between the dynamics of object’s form and our 
structure of emotions and feelings. For her, artworks are symbols, that present visible and audible 
forms that are congruent with our feelings, but the same way we must resort to metaphor to 
express many ideas, artworks are non-discursive symbols that articulate what is verbally ineffable – 
the logic of consciousness itself (Ibiden, 1993, p125).  
From this point forward, analytic aesthetics somehow evolved to “…narrower and more manageable 
range of philosophical questions…” (Ibiden, 1993, p127), and some of these “narrower” questions were 
(and are), for instance, the properties of artworks, the nature of the aesthetic experience, whether 
there can be a general theory of art at all, or relations between aesthetics and knowledge (Ibiden, 
1993). Here we briefly follow these questions: 
- If art objects are to be distinguished from ordinary objects, one should expect it to have 
different properties e.g., to have aesthetic properties; but can we identify it? 
For Walton (1970), aesthetic properties depend on whether they are “standard”, or 
“contra-standard”. Standard properties, for him, are those in virtue of which an artwork 
belongs to a given art historical or stylistic “category” (“impressionistic”, “functionalist”, etc.). 
“Contra-standard”, instead, are those tending to disqualify the work as a member of that 
“category” (BENDER and BLOCKER, 1993, p237). A category is correct for a work when the 
work has a preponderance of features standard with respect to that category, when the work is 
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better or more interestingly perceived within that category, when the artist intended the work to 
be perceived that way, or when perceiving the work in that way is socially acceptable. 
Categories, however, are presupposed and implicit in our perceptions, and often we are not 
consciously aware of it, because we simply take it for granted; they have been tacitly learned and 
included in our culture (Ibiden, 1993, p238). 
For Beardsley, instead (1981), aesthetic properties are, generally, those features of artworks 
usually referred to as “formal” properties, that is, properties that have to do with the 
relationship among the parts that make up an artwork (BENDER and BLOCKER, 1993, 
p234). The elementary parts, which cannot be further reduced to component parts, Beardsley 
calls “local qualities”, while properties that belong to a complex of such elementary parts he 
calls “regional qualities”. Regional qualities of greatest interest in aesthetic analysis are, then, 
those that “emerge” e.g., which are more than the sum of their parts, because they introduce a 
measure of novelty and unexpectedness, relative to the local qualities, that determines the 
“perceptual conditions” for its existence. Thus, a regional quality is a characteristic that exists 
on a given complex, but not on the elementary parts that make it, and a complete description of 
such complex would have to include the statement that such (regional) quality is present 8. Still, 
although regional qualities depend on the existence of local qualities, there is only a kind of 
probabilistic relation concerning its emergence. Therefore, an artist cannot guarantee a certain 
regional quality by mechanically following a formula for placing elements in a prescribed order, 
though he can make that outcome more probable. Further, he does not necessarily give up that 
regional quality by abandoning those elements, and their particular arrangement, in favour of 
other local qualities, although that usually results in a change of the regional quality (Ibiden, 
1993, p234).         
                                                 
8 In the following example, though very simple, the “square” is a regional quality, because it does not exists on any of the elements 
(circles) that make the figure. However, the example can easily be generalized to a Rembrandt drawing, where a dark area in the 
upper left-hand part of it, together with a light edge next to a girl dark hair, brings her head forward in space (BEARDSLEY, 1981, 
p3-4): 
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Hermeren, in turn (1988, p1), considers several qualities in aesthetic properties: 
(1) Reaction qualities (or affective ones), involving affective responses on the part of the 
beholder, or disposition to such responses, plus perhaps recognition that it is appropriate to 
have such dispositions. They vary from individual to individual, and “…their ontological and 
epistemological status is somewhat doubtful, to say the least” (Ibiden, p6). As examples: funny, 
moving, comic, surprising, impressive, trivial, etc. 
(2) Emotional qualities, recognised in the object that is seen but not in whoever produced it or is 
consuming it: solemn, serene, gay, cheerful, etc. 9  
(3) Taste qualities, related to cannons of taste internalised during a particular period. These 
qualities are clearly culture dependent, but “…taste concepts vary with doctrines of taste, rather than 
with individuals” (Ibiden, p6): elegant, delightful, sublime, harsh, beautiful, etc. 
(4) Gestalt qualities, where the words describing those qualities refer to a quality of the whole 
resulting from relations between the parts: coherent, complete, simple, harmonious, etc. 
(5) Behaviour qualities, where descriptions of how people behave are applied by metaphorical 
extension: nervous, intense, vigorous, graceful, etc10.   
(6) Natural qualities, which we can find in nature and apply by metaphorical extension too: 
worm, cool, bright, smooth, etc.  
As we can see, these perspectives show us that aesthetic properties cannot be simply “read off” 
from the “perceptual surface” of artworks, because they involve us in complex, non-deductive 
inferences, that although based on this sensory evidence are not exhausted by it (BENDER and 
BLOCKER, 1993, p238). Aesthetic properties “emerge” from this “surface”, but our sensitivity 
to this emergence is, in many cases, a function of our sensitivity to broader contexts - artistic, 
                                                 
9 Although differences from the previous item (1) may be confusing, the author considers that reaction qualities differ in many and 
interesting ways from emotional (or expressive) qualities. Accordingly (and to put it simply, here), the author stresses the 
importance of distinguishing, for instance, between: 
a) The tune X is melancholy (an emotional quality) 
b) The tune X makes me melancholy (a reaction quality) 
    Transcribing his own quotation: “The well-known psychologist James Gibson once said that it is possible that the melancholy in Mozart’s string 
quartets has not been discovered until quite recently, but it has been there all the time” (HERMEREN, 1988, p3).    
10 According to the author, behaviour qualities differ from emotional ones in the following way: when ascribed to persons, they refer 
to behaviour, rather than to moods or intentional states. He also states that it is possible to have different views on its exact 
relations: “Those who are Cartesian dualists will no doubt be inclined to treat those two kinds of qualities as quite distinct sets of entities, while those that 
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stylistic, historical, and cultural - in which artworks are situated (Ibiden, p238). 
 
- Now can we, at least, “characterise” this sensitivity, or must we consider that aesthetic 
experience is a concept that we should jettison? 
In the mid-1960’s George Dickie entirely rejected the notion of a uniquely aesthetic experience, 
considering it as a useless and misleading myth (Ibiden, p368). “(…) Aesthetic attitude functions to 
hold the moral and the aesthetic aspects of the work of art firmly apart. (…) People have been encouraged to take 
an aesthetic attitude (…) as a way of lowering their prejudices, say, against abstract and non-objective art. (…) 
The notion of aesthetic attitude has turned out to have no theoretical value for aesthetics (…)” (DICKIE, 
1964, p9-11).  
Nelson Goodman (1968, p4), in turn, considered that there is no dichotomy of cognitive versus 
emotive factors, or knowledge versus feeling, in the aesthetic experience, because “(…) aesthetic 
merit is such excellence in any symbolic functioning that, by its particular constellation of attributes, qualifies as 
aesthetic” (Ibiden, p6).  
Monroe Beardsley, however, persistently argued in favour of such concept, further relating it 
with the concepts of aesthetic perspective and aesthetic value: 
(1) “To adopt an aesthetic point of view with regard to X is to take an interest in whatever aesthetic value that 
X may possess, or that is obtainable by means of X” (BEARDSLEY, 1970, p4). 
(2) “The aesthetic value of an object is the value it possesses in virtue of its capacity to provide aesthetic 
gratification, when correctly and completely experienced” (Ibiden, p4-8). 
(3) Gratification is aesthetic e.g. it has an aesthetic character, when: 
a) “ It is obtained (…) from attention to the formal unity and/or the regional qualities of a complex 
whole (…)” (Ibiden, p5, parenthesis added). 
b) “It has at least four of these five features (symptoms), including the first one: (…) object-
directedness, (…) felt freedom, (…) detached affect, (…) active discovery, (…) sense of wholeness” 
(Ibiden, p.2, parenthesis added).       
Still, Arthur Danto would contest all these approaches, considering that “(…) the aesthetic point of 
view cannot be defined in terms of aesthetic experience, (…) because the nature and quality of our aesthetic 
                                                                                                                                                        
are monists will not. And those who hold that emotions and behaviour are correlated, or that one depends on the other, will tend to regard one of these 
classes of qualities as dependent on the other” (HERMEREN, 1988, p5). 
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response presuppose that we are viewing the objects of those responses as works of art” (BENDER and 
BLOCKER, 1993, p371).    
     
- What sort of things are, then, works of art? 
In 1958, Weitz argued that art could not be defined, in terms of concise and informative, 
logically necessary, and sufficient conditions, therefore claiming that art had no fixed and 
essential nature (BENDER and BLOCKER, 1993, p172). The goal of aesthetics would not be, 
than, to define art, but, instead, to elucidate the concept describing how we apply it 
(TEIXEIRA, 1999,p5). “Art (…) is an open concept. New conditions (cases) have constantly arisen and will 
undoubtedly (…) arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, which will demand decisions on the part of 
those interested, (…) as to whether the concept should be extended or not” (WEITZ, 1956, p5). 
In 1964, in turn, Arthur Danto publishes “The Artworld”, and initiates a major and influential 
project in which Danto tells us how the “artworld” makes art (SILVERS, 1987, p14). “We need 
the contexts provided by the “artworld” not only to see that some things (…) can be treated as art, but also to 
make them art. It is a mistake to try to discern some inherent nature within every work of art that is independent 
of these “artworld” contexts” (BENDER and BLOCKER, 1993, p173).  
George Dickie would also elaborate on this idea, further defining art in terms of the theories 
and practices that those who participate in the institutions surrounding the arts engage in 
(Ibiden, 1993, p174). “A work of art, in the classificatory sense, is (1) an artefact (2) a set of aspects of which 
has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person, or persons, acting on behalf of a 
certain social institution - the artworld” (DICKIE, 1974, p6). 
Aesthetics begun, then, to embrace the sociology of art, and following years, particularly since 
the 70s, saw aesthetics adapted (post-modernism), or challenged (postmodernism), by continental 
European thinking (TUMAS-SERNA, 1993, p90), and re-conceptualised in much expanded 
cultural and sociological configurations (BOURDIEU, 1984, 1987; SILVERMAN, 1989; 
TUMAS-SERNA, 1993; and others). Theories involved are enormously complex and difficult 
(BENDER and BLOCKER, 1993, p69), but we can summarise some of its broad 
characteristics as involving:  
(1) The rejection of truth e.g., the denial of the concept of true as a correspondence, or 
relation, between beliefs, claims, descriptions, or theories, and reality, facts, the way the 
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world is, or things in themselves (Ibiden, p4). 
(2) The rejection of “foundationalism” e.g., of indubitable bases, or unassailable foundations, 
on which we can rely in securing our knowledge of reality. Knowledge is no more a 
representation of an independent world of stable, factual nature, and it is deconstructed 
into changing and pragmatically governed views, interpretations, language games, forms of 
life, and expressions of power (Ibiden, p5).    
(3) An emphasis on the contingency, and conventionality, of rules and practices of rational 
though and judgement (Ibiden, p5). 
(4) A critique of the humanistic ideals of autonomy, self-knowledge, rationality, and 
impartiality. (Ibiden, p6) 
(5) An ascendance of rhetoric within discourse (Ibiden, p6).  
  
- Although we do not adopt, here, these latter perspectives, we certainly acknowledge that art, 
and the aesthetic on it, is relational and culturally emergent too. Therefore, if it involves the 
interaction of perceptible features of objects, human psychology, social conventions, and 
artistic institutions and traditions (BENDER and BLOCKER, 1993, preface), it probably tells 
us something about all these factors e.g., it probably is a kind of knowledge about our world. Still, 
controversy exists and to illustrate perspectives: 
Goodman (1968, p1-6) saw the “cognitive efficacy” of aesthetic symbols as a source of 
knowledge: “Symbolisation …is to be judged fundamentally by how well it serves the cognitive purpose” 
(Ibiden, p6). 
For Reid, however (1985, p1-8), the aesthetic is direct knowledge, or knowledge by 
acquaintance, which is not reducible or translatable into propositional knowledge, because it 
involves our feelings or affective awareness which is non-propositional; “Meanings are drawn in, 
transformed in aesthetic embodiment, and, as embodied, become localised in perceived space and time” (REID, 
1985, p6).  
Novitz also follows a similar reasoning (1987, p1-9), and considers it as empathic knowledge: 
“…the expression of such concepts in language will not serve to convey beliefs about what it actually feels like to 
have these experiences. It is such beliefs that … pass as empathic knowledge” (Ibiden, p3). 
Bender (1993, p1-10), in turn, goes even “a step beyond”, and argues that it is through aesthetics 
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that art becomes “a symbol suspended in a web of inferences”. Art, he says, give us “modal” 
knowledge, which can be a source of propositional knowledge, knowledge that “…something is 
necessary, lawful, probable, possible or impossible. Modal knowledge tell us about how things could or would or 
should be, under certain conditions, or in a certain context, and often concerns tendencies, potentialities, and 
generalities” (BENDER, 1993, p3). 
 
Consequently, the (necessarily pragmatic) premises here adopted are: 
 
P4. While we are not (still?) able of fully defining “the aesthetic”, we can consider it as a 
permanent phenomena of our conscience, whether involuntary or voluntary, and 
consequently a part of all knowledge.  
 
P5. In whatever social, economic, or cultural environment we choose to consider, hardly we can 
conceive “the aesthetic” without relating it, at least, to our concepts of emotions and 
feelings. Typically, however, we also relate it with other phenomena, namely our perception 
of objects form. 
 
1.4.2 – “The aesthetic” as consumer behaviour. 
 
“…Certain value domains, those dealing…with aesthetic matters, may not be testable at all.” 
(SCHEIN, 1985, p498) 
 
Although a line between our lived and our though experience is impossible to draw, we still 
commonly consider, at least as a plausible option, that differences exist on the very nature of these 
experiences. What we live (or experience) we take as somehow “different” of what we think (or 
conclude, in propositional terms) because our knowledge, in the former situation, is “outside” of 
what we can state, demonstrate or sometimes even validate 11, but in the latter depends on it to be 
as such considered. Further, often we tend to relate what we think to our rational capacities and 
what we live to our emotions and feelings or, at least, not to the first kind of abilities. In a sense, 
                                                 
11 This is not to say that we cannot, or do not attempt to do it, nor that we do not feel such attempts as valid and accurate.  
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then, we tend to put on one side what can be objective, true, propositional, refutable, built over or 
leading to meaning and, on the other, what belongs to the perspective, the subjective, the value or 
the qualitative. In practical terms, this probably reflects, and has (vice-versa) influenced “…the well-
known position that science deals with knowledge, art with emotions; science concerns truths, art concerns values; 
science establishes facts, art suggests perspectives” (BENDER and BLOCKER, 1993, p557) e.g., science and 
arts belong to different paradigms.  
Before going into some details, let us first consider that if we try to deal with “the aesthetic” a 
curious situation occurs: 
- Many times “the aesthetic” happens as if we first operate in a “direct apprehension” mode, one 
that we instantaneously feel as pleasant (or unpleasant) without knowing why. Then, if 
necessary and in the following moment, we switch to a “normal” mode of apprehension and, 
eventually, solve the ambiguity(s) of “the aesthetic” in reflecting about physical reality, whether 
we solve it in the geometry of the object, its colour, texture or whatever characteristic we see as 
relevant. On such occasions, therefore, it seems that we “begin” by having emotions and 
feelings when coping with “the aesthetic” of such reality, and then, after (or “above”) this 
experience, and if we feel that need, we uncover a meaning to it, even if we recognise that 
processes mutually reinforce themselves. In other words, we follow a kind of path that “starts” 
in our lived experience and “ends” on our thought one. 
- Other times, however, if we established an intimate connection between “a piece” of reality and 
“external” information, most probably influenced by our own development and/or 
environment, references and symbolism play a role such as we simultaneously feel and know (at 
least approximately) the reason why we are feeling that way. 
- Still further, we may even “know first and enjoy latter” as, for instance, when we feel the 
“aesthetic” delight of a “beautiful” hypothesis e.g., when we somehow follow the (inverse) path 
that lead us from our thought to our lived experience. 
Most importantly however, and to complicate things, situations coexist and mutually interfere, and 
all this happens in a way that is very difficult to untangle. Therefore, though we recognise “the 
aesthetic” as pervading our relation with the world, and its objects in particular, we have 
considerable difficulties in defining it. It seems to be part, simultaneously, of our lived and our 
thought experience, and we cannot translate the former experience into the latter: each of these 
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experiences is a component of a whole. Thus, attempting to deal with “the aesthetic” apparently 
involves characterising both these experiences: there are values, emotions, feelings or subjective 
states of mind “inside” what we are dealing with, but there are also characteristics of objects or 
situations too, no matter how diffuse they may be.  
Returning to the previous question of science vs. arts, it is not risky to imagine that if language 
could easily translate all components of the aesthetic experience, it would be relatively easy to 
“objectify” everything on it and, probably, this dichotomy would have not appeared. As, 
unfortunately, it apparently cannot, we may end up with the complex question of whether there is 
“representation” 12 at all for what we are calling “aesthetic”, a position so characteristic of (at least 
some) post-modern thought (STRONGMAN, 1996, p271-280) 13.  
We do not follow here postmodernist positions but we agree, nevertheless, that this is a crucial 
problem. We may take the affective/subjective component as critical, when addressing “the 
aesthetic”, but hardly we can avoid a perspective where it is “…the intellectually apprehended validity of 
objective impersonal true which counts…” (REID, 1985, p1), and thus what we must look for. If 
subjective knowledge becomes objective the moment we formulate it on language (POPPER, 1994, 
p26), the interference is obvious. In such a sense, too, the anthropological perspective of trying to 
“emphatically understand, or (…) reproduce in one’s own mind the feelings, motives, and thoughts behind the action of 
others” (DESHPANDE, 1983, p106, quoting MAX WEBER) e.g., a qualitative approach do not 
solves this question, either 14. 
Differently stated: on one side language probably lead us to consider “the aesthetic” as going 
“beyond science”, but on the other we need to address it using a dominant view of science (REID, 
1985, p1). 
All summed, we specially face the difficulty of explaining “the aesthetic” inside an objective frame 
of reference e.g., we do not easily find something that (ideally): 
                                                 
12 In the sense of something there, “objective”, underlying the words we are using.      
13 Without attempting a definition, we follow the view that in postmodernism the words we use to name emotions “…hide the aporia of 
the intertextual symbolic expression of the affective state that is built on language, to denote something that is always beyond the text (Affect)” 
(STRONGMAN, 1996, p272). Accordingly, “…emotions are not caused by environmental conditions. They are the expression of attitudes toward, 
judgements of, and illocutionary acts about the way environmental conditions are locally interpreted. And as such they must be treated as part of the speech.” 
(Ibiden, 1996, emphasis added) 
14 We are not questioning the relevance and pertinence of such approaches, of course; rather, our concern is with “the aesthetic” as a 
full language on itself that usually must be presented, not articulated, to be understood.    
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- Describe us its relations. 
- Help us in the task of exploring the field. 
- Allow us to identify (or characterise) “the aesthetic”, say (cumulatively) as: 
i) The existence of characteristics A or B in a given object (or situation), such as we can 
attribute to these characteristics the faculty of causing in us the appearance of “the 
aesthetic”. 
ii) Which of our characteristics, specifically, convey the phenomena 
 
Are we dealing, then, with an impossible task e.g., to understand (for marketing purposes) how and 
where “the aesthetic” happens, or, instead, avoiding it, in the sense of giving up to model it?  
Now, the fact that we seem unable to (linguistically) explain “the aesthetic” does not eliminate it as 
a human phenomenon; therefore, we must be able of dealing with it. Indeed the previous 
difficulties seem to fade, substantially, if we take “the aesthetic” as a biologic phenomenon somehow 
“parallel” (but always inherent) to our faculty of achieving meaning, intimately connected with our 
emotions and feelings, and existing in an “edifice” that we can call consciousness. Consciousness, 
however, is not conscience itself, in the sense of “… love, and honour and mercy; generosity and altruism; 
poetry and science; mathematical and technical invention…”(DAMÁSIO, 1994, p309). Rather, it is a “pre-
requisite” or “support” of its existence, and we cannot confound the phenomena with the 
“support” where it happens. Quoting Damásio, “The marvellous achievements that come from the human 
mind require consciousness in the same fundamental way that they require life, and that life requires digestion and a 
balanced internal chemical milieu. But none of these marvellous achievements is directly caused by consciousness” 
(Ibiden, 1994, p310). As so, “…what put the human mind on its pedestal, and should keep it there, are not only 
the biologic phenomena subsumed by the term consciousness, but also many other phenomena that we need to describe, 
name, and attempt to understand scientifically” (Ibiden, 1999, p311, emphasis added).  
Even so, we remain with the question of, unless we can previously “model” what we are calling 




C h a p t e r  2  
MODELING REALITY 
2.1 – A frame to “the aesthetic”. 
 
To effectively understand, or use, “the aesthetic”, when considering a brand, it would be important 
to know: 
- In what frame “the aesthetic” happens. 
- Why linguistic terms, alone, may not be our best “tool” to understand and describe “the 
aesthetic”, and if/how can we circumvent the problem. 
- Which variable can we use as a “proxy” to “the aesthetic”. 
These certainly are pertinent questions, but as they connect with one of the most formidable tasks 
we can carry as humans - the study of human consciousness - we must be humble in choosing our 
answers. Nevertheless, we can adopt some recent steps already given in this field (DAMÁSIO, 
1994; 1999) and Figure 1 shows, metaphorically of course, a possible frame to what can be at stake: 
 
Figure 1 - From Wakefulness to Conscience * 
 
* Source: DAMÁSIO, A. (1999, p310)- “The Feeling of What Happens” 
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As before in chapter 1, when considering the philosophical approach, attempting to describe here 
everything involved in Figure 1 would be to abandon a reasonable scope for this work. In addition, 
we are not questioning here consciousness, or conscience, nor are we debating what they are. We are just 
sharing a view about it. 
For practical purposes, then, it is enough to note that if our relation with objects starts by occurring 
“under” our language abilities, “the aesthetic” probably follows this rule. Thus, limitations derive in 
trying to explain this relation when we attempt to use a “higher” mechanism to describe a “lower” 
one 15. Consistently, we can recognise “the aesthetic” but we cannot exactly locate it: as “the 
aesthetic” is essentially experimented, (linguistically) describing it always a “substitution process”, in 
the sense that we can never say all about it.  
Thus, to study “the aesthetic” in others we may well need quantifying measures because, unlike 
“descriptions”, they better allow people to exteriorise a sign of what is happening to them when 
they are feeling “the aesthetic”. Consequently, it avoids in them, and in us, the need to consider the 
multiple senses of linguistic terms, or the danger of, in doing so, to be “trapped” by it or to “trap” 
others in the process. Therefore, in considering “the aesthetic” as a consumer behaviour we need, 
firstly, a quantitative approach, and only after a qualitative one. Due to practical limitations, 
however, we only develop here the quantitative one. 
Still, in considering “the aesthetic” as human phenomena, “just” quantifying it through the value 
that we (consciously or unconsciously) “apply” to virtually everything, be it an object, fact or a 
situation, in being a necessary step is not enough, because another question arises: the perspective we 
use. This perspective, in turn, will allow us to complete our answer.  
 
2.2 – A perspective about “the aesthetic”. 
 
Lilien, Kotler and Moorthy (1992, p25) organise consumer behaviour models under a five-stage 
process: need arousal, information search, evaluation, purchase, and post-purchase feelings. 
Concerning the evaluation stage, they also refer that “Most current models of the consumer evaluation 
process are cognitively oriented - that is, they see the consumer as forming product judgements largely on a conscious and 
                                                 
15 In the sense that the former also relies on the latter. 
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rational basis” (Ibiden, p27).  
If so, it must be that perspectives adopted consider, in more or less varying degrees, that people 
adopt the traditional view of “…noble reason in decision making” (DAMÁSIO, 1994, p183). 
Consequently, these studies share the view that “…we are in the best conditions to decide and we are the 
pride of Plato, Descartes and Kant when we let formal logic to lead us to the best solution to a problem” (Ibiden, 
p183). Thus, and perhaps also in varying degrees, inherent perspectives consider that, in each of us, 
“…different scenarios are considered one by one and…a cost-benefit analysis is made to each one. Having in mind a 
subjective estimate of utility, which is what the person pretends to maximise, he will deduce logically what is good and 
what is bad” (Ibiden, p183). 
Do we judge objects this way, even if we only consider those situations where we are highly 
involved? Hardly this appears be our basic “modus operandi”, and even less our only alternative to 
“understand” and “describe” the process, admitting that we can really do it. Also important, in 
describing the judgement of others we can also be more or less cognitively oriented. When doing it, 
in special, we can consider (or not) cognition itself e.g., all processes to which we call thought, as 
independent of the support where they happen. If we do, however, we (implicitly) consider the very 
essence of these processes so able of occurring in human brains as, for instance, in computers, and 
we (implicitly) embrace a (more or less) functionalist view of the mind (GÓIS, 1998, p2). 
In the limit, one of the consequences or, perhaps, inherent conditions in adopting this view, is that 
we are considering emotions and feelings simply as “states” of a (information-processing) system, 
to which we, necessarily, reduce consumers. Anderson, for instance, considers emotions and 
feelings as leading, essentially, to the setting of (human) goals that “feed” the system (ANDERSON, 
1996, p310). Goals, in turn, from the smaller one to the most complex we can imagine, “…are treated 
in this system as sources of high and constant activation” (Ibiden, p156), and control of cognition is made by 
“…conflict resolution principles” (Ibiden, p126). Still, the (functionalist) perspective has the advantage, if 
we share it, of “…avoiding the need to take a position about the type of correlation, if necessary or contingent, 
between mental events and physical events…”(GÓIS, 1998, p4). 
As it is, probably, already evident, this (functionalist) view is not the one adopted here. As Damásio 
puts it, “…if the (traditional view) is the only one that a person has available, rationality…will no work. At best, 
decision will take an enormous time, far superior to the acceptable to do anything else that day. At worst we can be 
even unable of arriving to a decision, because we will be lost in the process of computation” (Damásio, 1994, p184, 
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emphasis and parenthesis added). He also continues, stating that “…strategies of normal reasoning are 
full of deficiencies…and if our brains are able of deciding in seconds or minutes…according to our goals…they need 
more than pure reason. They need something quite different” (Ibiden, 1994, p184-5). “Somatic-markers” 
(Ibiden, 1994,1999) are the mechanism proposed, but he also challenges, in some crucial ways, our 
traditional assumptions about ourselves. 
A summary can go as follow, which we take as useful to understand “the aesthetic” 16:         
 
(1) We do not store and process  “…facsimiles…of …objects(s)…” (Ibiden, 1999, p321), nor (perceptive) 
images are (passive) “…photos…of things, events, words or phrases” (Ibiden, 1994, p116); rather we 
biologically react to our entire environment, be it physical or social, and in doing it we 
continuously develop brain dispositions (Ibiden, 1994, p110). Dispositions, in turn, do not store 
these images per se; instead, they are an human ability to reconstruct a sketch of those images 
e.g., evoked images which are “…attempts to replicate…” previously experimented patterns (Ibiden, 
1994, p117-121). 
 
(2) Emotions, which are induced non-consciously as basic mechanisms of life regulation, or as a 
consequence of the common thinking process (Ibiden, 1999, p56), emerge and lead to feelings, 
most of which are the mental experience of emotions (Ibiden, 1994, p16). Feelings (together 
with emotions that originate it) “…are so cognitive like any other perceptual image…” (Ibiden, 1994, 
p16-17; p172, emphasis added), and the “…essence of a feeling (the process of living an emotion) is not an 
illusory mental quality associated to an object, but a direct perception of a specific landscape: our body landscape” 
(Ibiden, 1994, p16). As so, emotions and feelings are “…a support system without which the edifice of 
reason cannot operate properly” (Ibiden, 1999, p42), and they establish “…a bridge between rational and 
non-rational processes…” (Ibiden, 1994, p143). Consequently, “…nature has created the instrument of 
rationality not only…above…the biologic…instrument, but also starting from and with it” (Ibiden, 1994, 
p143). 
 
(3) We continuously develop “…images of the interactions between each of us and an object which engaged our 
organisms, constructed in neural patterns form according to the organism’s design.” (Ibiden, 1999, p321, 
                                                 
16 Namely the one associated with visual experience. 
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emphasis added). Further, as we continuously bind perceptive images, evoked ones and feelings, 
through a mechanism known as “time binding” (Ibiden, 1994, p112) which requires attention and 
memory, dispositions are “…our whole store of knowledge and they include innate knowledge as well as 
knowledge acquired through experience” (Ibiden, 1994, p120). 
 
(4) “…Regardless of the degree of biological pre-setting of the emotional machinery, development and culture have 
much to say regarding the final product. In all probability…(they)…superpose the following influences:” 
- They shape what can adequately induce a given emotion. 
- They shape some aspects of the expression of emotion. 
- They shape the cognition and behaviour that follows the deployment of an emotion 
(Ibiden, 1999, p57). 
 
(5) Dispositions are also “somatic-markers” (Ibiden, 1994, p185), in the sense that they are a “…special 
case of our use of feelings…and which link them, through learning, to some kind of future results connected to 
particular scenarios” (Ibiden, 1994, p186). However, “somatic-markers do not take decisions for us. They 
help the decision-making process giving emphasis to some options, both adverse and favourable, and eliminating 
them, rapidly, from subsequent analysis” (Ibiden, p186). Thus, they “…allow us to choose an alternative 
inside a smaller number of alternatives. Cost-benefit analysis and (our) adequate deductive capacity still has its 
place, but only after this automatic process drastically reduce the number of options” (Ibiden, 1994, p185). 
 
Figure 2 summarises an important part of what can be involved, and if we return to those previous 
questions of understanding and describing “the aesthetic”, and choosing a “proxy” variable to it, a 
better “picture” emerges leading us the following premises, also pragmatic too: 
 
P6. “The aesthetic” translates part of the immediate, continuous, and biologic process of reaction 
to our environment.  
 
P7. “The aesthetic” starts by involving, mainly, unconscious “body” mechanisms of which only 
the result we are, or may be, aware. However, we can “mentally” replicate such mechanisms, 
consciously or unconsciously, once the first experience occurs, which in turn also modulates 
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its subsequent experience, and development, in face of context(s).  
 
P8. Emotions and feelings pervade all our conscience, and they are an adequate “proxy” to “the 
aesthetic” (which is consistent with P4 and P5).  
 
P9. Knowledge implies that we bind perception with emotions and feelings (This takes “the 
aesthetic”, then, as a part of all knowledge, which is consistent with P4, and intimately tied to 
perception, as considered in P5). 
 
P10. Development and culture shape our emotions and feelings, therefore we can also expect it to 
shape “the aesthetic” 17.  
  
 Figure 2 - Levels of Life Regulation * 
 
* Source: DAMÁSIO, A. (1999, p55)- “The Feeling of What Happens” 
                                                 
17 This is a rather complex matter. Common sense would probably agree on it, but relations seem to be more complex than some 
studies seem to suggest (for instance, BOURDIEU, 1979), because emotions and feelings are not solely generated by education, 
within a culture; they are biologically preset, in part or mostly (DAMÁSIO, 1999, p342). In addition, some studies tend even to 




2.3 – Linking “the aesthetic” with brands. 
 
A question remains: even if we can understand “the aesthetic” and find a “proxy” variable to it, can 
we use it independently e.g., as a specific marketing variable through which we can, for instance, better 
support a new brand? Stating it differently, can we specifically manipulate a variable like “the 
aesthetic” so that, through such manipulation, we acquire some useful knowledge that helps us to 
support a new brand? 
Let us take Pierce perspective about modes of reference (PIERCE, in ZAKIA, 1997, p238), to 
“break” the point of view of consumers when (visually) confronted with objects. Pierce basic types 
of representation are the iconic, the indexing and the symbolic one, and we have used it, mainly, in 
visual arts (BELTON, 1999). In the iconic reference, the (possible) meaning “extracted” by 
consumers has a direct relation to object(s) involved, and consumers base it on similarity in 
appearance. In the indexing one, consumers base their meaning on cause and effect relationships; so, 
they understand signs presented to them as conveying some indirect reference to something. 
Finally, in the symbolic reference, consumers base their meaning on convention, and relationships 
between consumer and object are purely arbitrary (Ibiden, 1999). 
Now “the aesthetic” pervades the whole point of view of consumers, and it is differently 
experimented under each of these modes of reference. So, as all these modes usually coexist in a 
person/object relationship, to any consumer each mode translates, in a sense, a part of “the 
aesthetic”, when globally considered. Therefore, there are such things as “the iconic aesthetic” (for 
instance to enjoy an abstract form), “the indexing aesthetic” (for instance, to like what is implicit in a 
concrete use of it), and “the symbolic aesthetic” (for instance, the arbitrary valorisation of some 
characteristics of who made it, or where) 18.  
If we now conjugate this with Keller perspective about brands (1993; 1998), an interesting situation 
occurs. Keller defines his concept of “Customer-Based Brand Equity” as “…the (I) differential effect 
that (II) brand knowledge has on (III) consumers response to the marketing of that brand” (1998, p45, emphasis 
and parentheses added). As, according to P4, “the aesthetic” is included in all knowledge (condition 
II), we can separately measure how consumers value objects under different conditions e.g., 
                                                 
18 The distinction is essentially theoretical, of course, and it appears for analytical purposes. In practice, there are endless gradations of 
it, which we may take as part of a “continuum” with Iconic-Symbolic extremes.    
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measure how “the aesthetic” changes between different modes of reference. Then, if results show a 
differential effect in consumer’s response (conditions I and III), for instance in regard to extremes 
of the Iconic/Symbolic “continuum”, we can infer that we are, probably, in the presence of a 
brand, be it deliberate - in the sense of specific marketing actions - or not e.g., the result of random 
circumstances.  
Even so, we need some words of caution: “the aesthetic” always pervades the consumer/object 
relationship but it can be, or not, most of it, in the sense of being actually understood as such. 
Consistently, neither we always adopt such a point of view, nor we only do it when we can, 
although some people clearly do it more than others. Indeed emotions and feelings are a much 
wider phenomena then the one we want it, here, to represent, because they are a condition to 
rationality, and not only to what we recognise as “aesthetic”. Moreover, “deciding what constitutes an 
emotion is not an easy task (…) Others have struggled with the same problem and concluded that it is hopeless” 
(DAMÁSIO, 1999, p340-341) 19.   
Consequently, difficulties appear if we want to compare these judgements. In fact, we must be 
reasonably sure that people share something about the objects they are evaluating, the moment they 
are doing it. Otherwise, the simple use of a scale, among individuals, to measure such evaluation, 
may lead us to confront different substantive realities e.g., a common scale - on itself - give us, only, 
a weak (facial) validity of the measure. 
In practical terms, then, if we want to address “the aesthetic” and understand when it (eventually) 
changes, we need: 
- Firstly, to objectify the “proxy”; and to this we can use the “umbrella” concept of Affect 
(BAGOZZI, 1999, p184), understood as a “…general category for mental feeling processes…” (Ibiden) 
subsuming more than one “kind”, “sort”, or “type” of emotions and/or feelings (we admit to 
be) relevant to “the aesthetic” phenomenon. Affect will then represent, here, people’s judgements 
of value.  
- Secondly, we need to consider those judgements in light of its immediate context e.g., Perception, 
                                                 
19 In fact, approaches to emotion widely differ, and perspectives vary according to whether they emphasise phenomenological, 
physiological, cognitive, behaviour or social questions, just to name a few inside the psychological field. However, the topic has 
been also the subject of many other disciplines, like philosophy, anthropology, history or sociology. In the words of Strongman 
“…(all these concerns)…suggest not only the importance of adopting a pluralist approach as, also, the need to emphasise the qualitative and quantitative 
development of research methods” (1996, p282).   
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and from our perspective Perception continuously involves, in time, and under an element of 
subjectivity brought in by emotions (and feelings): 
(1) Something that happens along, and interferes with, both people’s sensation and 
cognition e.g., something mental those individuals live: a psychological “element”.  
(2) Something that individuals enounce about stimuli: a logical “element”. 
(3) Something that translates to individuals an external reality: an “element” concerning the 
ontology of (all) objects.   
Differently stated, the context is multidimensional, and it possibly involves different judgements of 
fact.  
As a result, we add another three premises (P11, P12 and P13) to the following summary of 
assumptions, before presenting a case study where we attempted to cross “the aesthetic” with 
brands: 
 
Summary of Assumptions: 
 
P1. Brands are the expression of a (differential) value, as seen from consumers’ point of view. 
 
P2. Effective marketing actions e.g., actions that cause brands, presuppose we conceive and 
advertise a product in face of, and towards consumer’s taste and preferences (“values”). 
 
P3. Marketing has pushed forward, not backwards, the importance of “the aesthetic”.  
 
P4. While we are not (still?) able of fully defining “the aesthetic”, we can consider it as a 
permanent phenomena of our conscience, whether involuntary or voluntary, and 
consequently a part of all knowledge.  
 
P5. In whatever social, economic, or cultural environment we choose to consider, hardly we can 
conceive “the aesthetic” without relating it, at least, to our concepts of emotions and 
feelings. Typically, however, we also relate it with other phenomena, namely our perception 




P6. “The aesthetic” translates part of the immediate, continuous, and biologic process of reaction 
to our environment. 
 
P7. “The aesthetic” starts by involving, mainly, unconscious “body” mechanisms of which only 
the result we are, or may be, aware. However, we can “mentally” replicate such mechanisms, 
consciously or unconsciously, once the first experience occurs, which in turn also modulates 
its subsequent experience, and development, in face of context(s). 
 
P8. Emotions and feelings pervade all our conscience, and they are an adequate “proxy” to “the 
aesthetic”. 
 
P9. Knowledge implies that we bind perception with emotions and feelings. 
 
P10. Development and culture shape our emotions and feelings, therefore we can also expect it to 
shape “the aesthetic”. 
 
P11. As a permanent connection exists between “the aesthetic” and perception, to effectively 
analyse the former we need to “freeze” the latter e.g., to establish a “Ceteris Paribus” 
condition. In this particular sense, “the aesthetic” is always relative to a given context. 
 
P12. “The aesthetic” is continuously present in our relation with all objects; therefore, we can 
only expect to detect when it changes, not when it happens.  
 
P13. With “the aesthetic”, we can only ordinally quantify its intensity, metaphorically characterise its 




C h a p t e r  3  
CASE STUDY 
3.1 – Statement of Problem 
 
In 1998, ICEP - Investments, Commerce and Tourism of Portugal (Oporto Delegation) was 
considering a well-known fact. As José Manuel da Fonseca, its Director, described it at the time 20:  
“(…) This country image is distorted, doesn’t differentiate us and isn’t the image of modernity; we still promote 
Portugal through a simple idea of sun and beach; (…) its urgent to replace this idea by quality components, 
(…) facts that better reflect this country reality.”    
“(…) Architecture has a very strong cultural component, as well as possible connections to business, tourism, 
design and related industries; (…) the example (of Álvaro Siza) could be studied as an internationalisation 
case, as well as a factor of local development where his projects are build; Álvaro Siza is an architect, a 
designer, a draftsman and a writer.” 
And latter on, specifically about the architect design: 
“(…) Siza only works if challenged, only conceives when strongly solicited; (…) unfortunately, those who 
produce his furniture, at a commercial scale, adopt expensive and difficult solutions; there are many problems 
with norms and specifications and with market customisation; sometimes those who make the (Siza) objects 
aren’t even Portuguese! (…) Wouldn’t it worth to change this?” 
To ICEP some questions were, and still are, central: 
- How to change the Portuguese traditional image promoted abroad by ICEP, increasingly 
considering successful Portuguese cases capable of fostering a modernity image. 
- How to support national industries grow, internalising production carried on outside the 
country. 
Interestingly, a “by Siza” brand could perfectly contribute to solve both questions, and the architect 
design seemed an excellent option towards that goal. 
                                                 
20 In a direct interview. 
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Indeed the question was tempting, and possibly adequate to cross the field of aesthetics with the 
one of brands. Still, implications were complex: as an architect, “Álvaro Siza” is a griffe; helping to 
change it into a brand, a “by Siza” brand in the design field was, no doubt, a challenge 21. In 
particular, it would imply to know if Siza objects already follow, or not, consumer’s taste or 
preferences 22 and, most importantly, whether we could trace a noticeable difference, at the “aesthetic 
level”, suggesting “a brand” among consumers involved 23.    
Contemporary most potent meaning of Design is that of “…added-value in the form of style – an 
indefinable quality that makes things not only useful but also more desirable…” (TURNER, 1996) therefore, 
and to begin with, we admitted that all could start by accepting to be contingent, although 
pro-active, on aesthetic matters 24. Thus, a survey of “experimental aesthetics” would be an 
adequate option, specially if it could be applied to existent pieces of his work, but as available 
resources were known to be limited, only a pre-test would be possible. 
We thought, next, about those associations to the architect name, or work, that could be important 
to consider. In marketing, the Image concept often unifies several effects (associations, attitudes, 
etc.) that translate the existence of a brand (AAKER, 1991; SOLOMON, 1992; KELLER, 
1993,1998; DIMITRIADIS, 1994; LILIEN KOTTLER and MOORTHY, 1994; SHIFFMAN and 
KANUK, 1997; SERRA, 1998). Unfortunately, definitions remain tied to the perspective we use, 
and widely vary (ZINKHAN and HIRSCHHEIM, 1992, p84-85; SERRA, 1998, p37). Yet, such 
(in) consistency does not dim its importance; on the contrary, only calls for a previous delineation 
of sense, and we took here it as consisting, roughly, both in judgements of fact (Perception) and of 
value (Affect), because hardly they are not inherent, if not central, to such concept.  
In architecture it is certainly easy to find a vast universe of people who, in a more or less consensual 
                                                 
21 Distinction is rather subtle, and diffuse, if we take the broad sense of a brand, but it clearly applies if we instead consider a stricter 
sense in it: common production modes of architecture and design 
22 Premise P2 about “effective” marketing actions (e.g., actions that may cause brands) became, then, a kind of “methodological 
postulate”, given our goal.   
23 If, according to premise P1, a differential value is a constituent part of a brand, knowing if it (also) involves “the aesthetic” is only a 
particular corollary, whether we may or not justify its cause(s). We took such (eventual) difference as probably helpful to further 
marketing actions.  
24 Following the 1990s, and in face of the previous role design played within consumption, new approaches attempted to “…redefine 
design as a toll for the improvement of society, albeit in an environmental rather than an aesthetic way” (TURNER, 1996). We could also add to 
this trend, for instance, the influence of ergonomic considerations in design, but even so we emphasise, here, the meaning that 
connects it with “the aesthetic”, because it does not prevents the (implicit) inclusion of such questions. On the contrary, it is the 
lack of a favourable “aesthetic” that may be problematic, as more generally recognised in P3.      
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way, connect Álvaro Siza to the mastery of several difficult issues: the use of materials, light, scales 
and customisations are examples, just to name a few. Quite justly, that led the Hyatt Foundation to 
grant him the Pritzker prize in 1992 25. However, it was (and is) risky to transpose these 
characteristics to people’s understanding of Álvaro Siza design, even if the architect sees“…a natural 
link between furniture design, architecture, and urban intervention…”(SIZA, 1999) 26. There was (or is) no 
such evidence. Thus, although we could expect that (at least some) consumers would probably have 
(some) knowledge of his work, therefore presupposing on them premises P4 and P5 as granted, we 
could not infer either that Siza design was part of that knowledge or, if it was, that the previous link 
was indeed “real”, from consumers’ point of view. Besides, even admitting “a priori” such link as 
possible, as we did, its consequences at the “aesthetic level” were an open question. Therefore, as 
furniture seemed a representative option of Siza design, we choose the Image of his furniture, in the 
previous delineated sense of Perception/Affect, as theme to research. 
Finally, we considered another question. With the possible exception of a limited number of 
Portuguese people, better informed, the work of Álvaro Siza along the last decades suggests it was 
– most probably – sooner recognised abroad than in Portugal (AZEVEDO, COELHO and REIS, 
1998). Thus, as we expected a connection between culture and “the aesthetic” (premise P10), any 
study would gain if it would explore the question e.g., an international survey seemed imperative, 
and this, in turn, was compatible with ICEP interests.   
 
3.2 – Purpose of Study 
 
With the help of ICEP foreign delegates and offices, spread by several countries, we projected an 
international survey. Despite of its limits, both in depth and in size, we wanted to understand how 
people would react to the furniture of Álvaro Siza; therefore, we would try to model “the aesthetic” 
on it, and its dependence on available information. Due to opportunity, however, survey could also 
explore other interesting conditions, namely differences in appraisal resulting from geographical 
locations, level of knowledge (education), gender, age or professional activity. The only assumption 
                                                 
25 Jury citation in http://www.pritzkerprize.com/main.htm 
26 Direct interview. 
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was that people could possibly differ, even remarkably, in reality appraisal; consequently, the 
assumption would necessarily respect the (eventual) incidence of cultural differences.  
We previously delineated markets crossing two components: knowledge and geography. 
Knowledge was taken using education level as a sufficient indicator: a 3 to 5 university degree was 
the condition defined in choosing subjects for analysis, considering that evaluation involved would 
imply some education in judgement(s). Geography should also conform to ICEP interests, and it 
led to a choice of seven countries: Portugal, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, USA, Brazil and 
Japan. 
The empirical frame of reference e.g., the kind of stimuli that could be relevant for analysis was 
another complex question. Which objects, and of which designers, should we use to “confront” 
with those of Siza? Chances were high that, in starting such a research, any subset of objects, and 
authors, derived from practical reasons would be arbitrary, as well as biased. As the central concern 
was the market approach instrument, and time was a significant concern too, we considered that:  
- Chairs are, usually, significant examples of many designers activity and, presumably, “universal” 
objects to consumers.  As they are particularly adaptable to specific context(s), they can also 
(eventually) convey, on themselves, useful cues over its author, history or production 
circumstances and context, thus broadly allowing to capture such influences.  
- A selection of “equivalent” names, in turn, could deserve “ad-hoc” consideration, because we 
assumed that if results would prove to be interesting it would always be possible, in the future, 
to change authors (and stimuli) involved, to increase its relevance, or to question its adequacy 
for a particular analysis. Further, we even assumed that only subsequent research would allow 
us to untangle, in “detail” and for practical purposes, the inherent complexity of “the aesthetic”.  
Therefore, seven well-known names, widely mentioned among architecture, design and arts 
sources (see, for instance, TURNER, 1996; COLOMBO, 1997, or the excellent internet site 
www.iserv.net/~plucas/index.htm about furniture design 27) were additionally included in 
survey 28. 
The questionnaire (Appendix A) included, then: (1) a measure of people’s affect regarding visual 
                                                 
27 This reference applies to October 2000. Since the beginning of this work, some web sites containing references to authors and 
objects used in our survey have remarkably changed, or even disappeared. Even so, some remain useful as, for instance, 
www.vitra.com, www.interstudio.dk, www.kartell.com, www.classiconline.com, or www.designarchitecture.com.     
28 See also the results discussion (Chapter 4)   
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stimuli (photos of furniture), using a three items Likert scale of seven points; (2) a measure of 
similarity/dissimilarity between pairs of stimuli to access people’s perception about it; (3) some 
questions allowing us to search for the (eventual) incidence of demographic/cultural factors. To 
simulate the “iconic/symbolic” condition, the questionnaire also had two variants, each applying to 
a different group, allowing to access people’s judgements under different information contexts:  
- In one of these variants, visual stimuli included author’s name, thus allowing the presence of 
information, in time of judgment, beyond the one (we could fairly hope) people would extract 
from photos, alone. Answers could then reflect indexing/symbolic considerations, for instance, 
the influence of the “link” we had previously admitted.  
- In the other, we replaced author’s name by a code, trying to limit the amount of information 
possibly involved in judgement(s). Answers would then reflect, or emphasise, objects iconic 
dimension. 
Sampling size was the final question. Classical rules could not apply, as ICEP itself would conduct 
the survey, and practical limitations existed. Therefore, we asked to ICEP for convenience samples 
of, at least, 40 (20 with names + 20 without names) questionnaires in each country, which would 
give an expected 320. Survey ended up, however, including only four countries - Portugal, Italy, 
Sweden and Japan - due to latter ICEP options. The number of respondents was also less than 
expected in Italy (only 20) and, in Japan, respondents made some errors in expressing their age. 
Still, 163 inquires were considered valid to analysis. Table 1 summarises the sample and Appendix B 
further details it (Section 1, page 99): 
Table 1 - Sample Summary  
21 7 32 19 79
21 13 30 20 84
13 6 27 1 47
29 14 35 2 80
36 17 38 34 125
6 3 24 5 38
12 9 21 25 67
20 4 11 1 36
6 2 6  14
1  11 6 18
3 5 13 7 28
21 10 30 20 81
21 10 32 19 82
















                  Total




Sub-samples translate some basic differences considered for analysis, building over the information 
 
 38 
collected in questionnaires. A three to five years of university education correspond to “Low” 
education, and a master or PhD degree to “High” education. Sub-samples concerning the “working 
field” of respondents aggregate, in five groups, 24 different professions declared. 
Analysis sometimes ignored some sub-samples, due to its small size. 
 
3.3 – Methodology 
 
Addressing the theoretical concept of Image could not be made unless we could measure it in a 
useful and meaningful way, for instance, through one (or more) valid and reliable empirical 
indicator(s), in other words through a scale.    
We may employ scaling models for three related but distinct purposes (McIVER and CARMINES, 
1981, p8, p13): describing a data structure (exploratory analysis), as a scaling method on which 
individuals can be given scores, and hypothesis testing. In addition, we can distinguish scaling 
models according to whether they are one-dimensional or multidimensional in nature, as well as to 
whether they are intended to scale persons, stimuli, or both persons and stimuli.  
Mciver and Carmines (1981, p13) also refer that the concept of dimensionality is complex, namely 
because the substantive and technical meaning of the term is specific to the particular scaling 
model, that is, dimensionality means different things for different scaling models. 
Regarding the concepts of dimensionality and scaling, Jacoby (1991, p27) refers that, from a 
substantive perspective, the dimensionality of a set of objects is simply defined as the number of 
separate and interesting sources of variation among objects. All scaling strategies seek to represent 
objects as points within a space, relating geometric differences in the point locations to the 
substantive differences among the objects. He continues, stating that we can use most scaling 
procedures in two different ways: 
- Firstly, we can use a scaling procedure as a scaling criterion, to ascertain whether a particular 
dimension structure accurately represents an empirical set of data. 
- Secondly, after a particular dimensional structure is appropriately decided, we can use the 
procedure as a scaling technique, to measure the objects with respect to the dimensions. 
Given the usual difficulties in separating theory from method (DESPANDES, 1983, p104), these 
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procedures end up by also reflecting themselves on choices between one-dimensional and 
multidimensional approaches, when dealing with a particular problem. 
Shively (1980, in McIVER and CARMIN, 1981, p14) has argued in favour of one-dimensional 
concepts because they are more susceptible to theory-relevant research, multidimensional concepts 
typically hampering such research because they are too ambiguous in terms of their meaning, too 
difficult to measure in a clear and precise manner, and too theoretically oriented themselves. 
Van Schuur (1984, 1988, in JACOBY, 1991, p36), in turn, notes that multidimensional models 
assume that all of the dimensions operate simultaneously, in contributing to the observed 
differences between the scaled objects, which can be problematic. Even if a set of objects possesses 
K “objective” characteristics, there is no particular reason that all of the characteristics are used to 
differentiate among all of the objects. 
Here the purpose of the study was exploratory, and in face of the previous questions we had: 
- The substantive question - the concept of image - as multidimensional;  
- Perception and Affect as empirical indicators (the former also working as a “frame” to the later 
e.g., Affect being possibly contingent of Perception, according to P11); 
- A concern about both the criterion and the technique of scaling; in other words, which 
“structure”, if any, could we use to model a phenomenon (e.g., a criterion), and how would 
people “distribute” themselves under it (e.g., a technique)?  
- The idea of simultaneously to scale both individuals and stimuli, because: 
(1) We wanted to characterise an interaction between people and objects, each (and every 
of it) uniquely developed and configured in a given individual and for a given object 29; 
thus, any characterization should preferentially account for what we see as a “relational 
nature” in the phenomena (BEARDSLEY, 1983, p302).  
(2) Recognizing the peculiar nature of “the aesthetic” (P13), and as both the qualitative and 
the quantitative approaches imply limitations, may be this process could substitute, at 
least in a preliminary step, the more complex process of “triangulating” research 
methods (qualitative and quantitative) (DESPANDES, 1983, p106-109); 
(3) Available resources were scarce, and such a single step could solve the question. 
                                                 
29 It may be useful to recall here references (3) and (4) in page 26/27, taken from Damásio, from where we derived our premises P6 
to P9 (pages 27/28).  
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Moreover, it could bring some useful heuristic value to subsequent research.  
Therefore, perhaps the sophistication of models and computer software nowadays could help.  
At a one-dimensional level, the simultaneous scaling of stimuli and individuals raises the question 
that Torgerson (in McIVER and CARMIN, 1981, p9) has observed as: “the task set for the subject is to 
respond to a stimulus on the basis of the position of the stimulus in relation to the subject's own position with respect to 
the attribute”. This is what we call a “response approach” (McIVER and CARMINES, 1981, p9), and 
Guttman scales are an example to deal with it. 
At a multidimensional level, however, the task becomes much more complex. The strategy is to 
conduct an overall analysis, yielding a “group” solution, but model also providing variation in the 
parameters corresponding to individual sources of data (ARABIE, CARROLL and 
DeSARBO, 1987, p8). 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) models are a class of techniques that use “proximity's” among any 
kind of objects as input, in order to build a spatial representation of those objects expressed in 
output as a geometric configuration of points. These “proximity's” are numbers which indicate how 
similar (or dissimilar) two objects are, or are perceived to be by subjects, but although similarity 
(dissimilarity) are most frequently used to elicit psychological proximity judgements, alternative 
words as relatedness, dependence, association, complementarity, substitutability, and so on, also 
apply (KRUSKAL and WISH, 1978, p9). 
Although MDS models exist since 1952 (TORGERSON, 1952; McGEE, 1968; in YOUNG and 
HARRIS, 1996) they only addressed the scaling of stimuli, however noting that McGee RMDS 
(Replicated MDS) model was already able to account for individual differences in response 
bias. Only in 1970 with the INDSCAL (Individual Differences Scaling) model (CARROLL and 
CHANG'S, 1970) the simultaneous consideration of stimuli and subjects was effectively addressed, 
through the introduction of the notion of “weights”, that account for individual differences in the 
perceptual or cognitive processes that generate the responses (YOUNG and HARRIS, 1996, p144).   
The INDSCAL model assumes that objects (stimuli and subjects) belong to a continuous space 
common to all sources of data. It portrays individual differences among sources of data by 
differentially shrinking, or stretching (i.e. weighting), each dimension in the space solution 
according to the implied emphasis given to the dimension by a specific source of data (ARABIE, 
CARROLL and DeSARBO, 1987, p8).   
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This approach to scaling has evolved since then, several sources describing its developments and 
associated computer programs (DeLEEUW, 1977; KRUSKAL and WISH, 1977; RAMSAY, 1982; 
TAKANE, YOUNG and DeLEEUW, 1977; YOUNG, 1981,1984; YOUNG and HAMER, 
1994)30. In particular, one of the relevant variations between approaches concerns the kind of “fit” 
used by the algorithm in translating dissimilarities (similarities) to geometric distances, INDSCAL 
model using scalar products, ALSCAL31 model (TAKANE, YOUNG and DeLEEUW, 1976) using 
squared Euclidean distances, and SMACOF (DeLEEUW, 1977) - which is still under development 
- using simple Euclidean distances. More important however, in such approaches, is that we can 
interpret solutions in two separate components (YOUNG and HARRIS, 1996, p145): 
a) A stimuli space, representing the information shared by all individuals in what regards to the 
structure of the stimuli. 
b) A subject space (weights space) representing the information that is unique to each 
individual about the structure of the stimuli i.e., weights being interpreted as the 
importance, relevance or salience of each dimension to each individual. Accordingly, if we 
group individuals to represent experimental conditions, the interpretation is that weights 
reflect the importance of each dimension in the various experimental conditions (YOUNG, 
1999), the same applying if individuals are “split” into relevant sub-groups for analysis.  
Table 2 compares some characteristics of MDS programs: 
Table 2  
 
Source: Forrest W. Young “ Multidimensional Scaling”, on-line papers, http://forrest.psych.unc.edu/, Feb.99. 
                                                 
30 In Young and Harris, 1996 
31 ALSCAL – Alternating Least Squares Scaling (Takane, Young &  De Leeuw, 1976) 
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Here, M stands for metric, N for non-metric, MN for both analysis, C for classic, R for replicated, 
W for weighted, O for other types, D for distances, P for scalar products, S for square distances, L 
for log distances, L (again) for least-squares program, M (again) for maximum likelihood, and “dyn” 
for dynamic allocation in the number of dimensions allowed (e.g., no limit). 
Thus, an MDS model - ALSCAL in particular - seemed the adequate process to access people’s 
Perception about stimuli involved, because: 
- The model starts by the basic assumption that people differ in reality appraisal, not only in 
response bias but also in the perceptual or cognitive processes that generate the responses 
(YOUNG, 1996, p1). Accordingly, each individual has its perceptual map, which means that 
there is no constrains limiting the number, or nature, of possible influences in individuals 
coming from whatever reasons we may think of (social, economical, historical, etc.) 
- Simultaneously scaling individuals and stimuli, using ALSCAL, would also respect the rather 
complex nature of Perception itself, an important question in establishing a credible “frame” to 
study another variable (Affect).  In fact, if we take the key points of the model: 
(1) The adjustment, for each individual, between his own perceptual map (built by the 
model for every individual) and his answer given in survey, the relevant number of 
dimensions, and its relative weight, fairly translates us (and emphasise) the psychological 
“element” in Perception;  
(2) Individual weights, subsequently used by model to compute shared data, fairly remove, 
on this data, the (individual) subjectivity that is inherent to each perceptual map, 
although it does not guarantees - on itself - full compatibility between people’s 
appraisal.  
(3) The configuration of stimuli e.g., which pair of stimuli has - specifically - more or less 
similarity, reasonably translates us the logical “element(s)” of Perception; 
(4) The information shared by all subjects (or by any sub-group of it we choose to consider), 
some of the (possible) stimuli configurations, and the adjustment of (all) individuals to 
it, may lead us to admit that we are - eventually - “grasping” some interesting source of 
variation in stimuli involved. Such variation may, or not, be tied to substantive 
characteristics of objects involved, it may, or not, simplify us the comprehension of it, 
and it may have a more or less obvious nature. Still, it certainly has the power of leading 
 
 43 
us to raise questions about the “ontology” of the whole phenomenon.   
A Likert scale, in turn, seemed a convenient (one-dimensional) scaling process to access people’s 
Affect. That would agree not only with common approaches as, given the scaling process used in 
Perception, we would be able to relate both variables, taking Affect as “property” that happens in 
people along with Perception.  
As psychological variables, quantifications of Affect as well as (di) similarities in Perception would 
have, basically, an ordinal nature. In fact, only with difficulty one can assert that measures of such 
subjective quantities, or states, even if operated as ordered categories, reflect exact amounts of 
some variable represented by those categories. Moreover, research in human cognition suggests we 
assume that people have limited information processing ability, hence quantifying capacity 
(HILDEBRAND, LAING and ROSENTHAL, 1977, p16). Scaling processes would be ranking 
processes then e.g., more or less of something, not how much more or less (even if expressed that 
way), and we had to consider measures as ordinal. 
 
3.4 – Computations and Results 
 
An exploratory approach to data analysis differs, in three ways, from the more traditional ones 
(HARTWIG and DEARING, 1979, p19): 
- It relies more heavily on measures of location and spread that have the property of resistance 32. 
- It uses several summary statistics, rather than just one or two, in order to characterise 
distributions. 
- It makes use of visual summaries. 
Here we present a resume.  Appendix B details computations. 
 
3.4.1 – Perception 
 
We began attempting to scale Perception. As shown in Appendix A, subjects were asked to scale 
                                                 
32 A resistant measure (of either location or spread) is one that is relatively unaffected by or resistant to changes, no matter how large, 




stimuli individually, according to their own subjective understanding of reality e.g., using whatever 
criteria they choose to look for in comparing stimuli.  This conveyed a collection of inherently 
individual processes of relatively scaling “amounts” of dissimilarity (similarity) between stimuli, not a 
whole scaling of stimuli or subjects according to some common criteria. We used, then, ALSCAL (in 
SPSS software v. 9.0), trying to find if the whole set of ranks could be scaled according to 
(presumably) more than one dimension (subjects latent criteria), its implicit meaning being directly 
related with a shared perspective of all subjects about all stimuli. If the process would be adequate to 
our goals, the simultaneous scaling of subjects and stimuli should yield, accordingly, patterns of 
dissimilarity (similarity) of higher order between stimuli, as well as patterns of subject answers 
regarding those stimuli. A common and unique (although presumed multiple) set of dimensions 
would appear, after confronting several solutions, thus resulting in Perception scaling. 
We repeated computations in order to analyse solutions from 2 to 6 possible dimensions. Several 
questions apply to the way we must carry these computations and they include, for instance, the 
type of data, its shape, the level of measurement, the approach to “conditionality”, etc. Young and 
Harris, in Chapter 14 of SPSS v 7.5, make an excellent summary. The model is also sensible to the 
number of iterations allowed, the minimum “stress” change (a measure of goodness of fit between 
model and data) in each iteration step, the final precision pretended and the number of ties allowed 
in the algorithm. To some extent, then, we must tentatively achieve an adequate solution. 
In general, we were able to extract solutions with 2 to 6 dimensions. A few were not possible, 
however, due to linear dependencies between variables. As both the stability of dimensions and the 
analysis of sub-samples were at concern, we carried systematic computations for all sub-samples so 
that we could make reasonable comparisons. Table 3 confronts model parameters across countries, 
as well as between experimental groups (the one where respondent knew author’s name, and the 
one where they did not) as the number of dimensions changes 33. Appendix B, in turn, shows 
computations about all sub-samples considered (Section 2, pages 100-102). 
We can interpret computations parameters as follow: 
- “Young S-Stress” and “Kruskal Stress” are global measures of “goodness of fit” between 
model and data, and the lower these measures are, the better. As the number of dimensions 
increases, its value always decreases, of course, because more dimensions allow the model to 
                                                 
33 The analyst has control over the number of dimensions he wants to test, each time he runs the model. 
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adapt itself better to data. 
- Average RSQ represents the (average) adjustment between each subject as described in the 
model, and the same subject as described in questionnaire. The higher it is the best, because 
that means the model is well representing, geometrically, the psychological differences between 
stimuli as seen by subjects. 
- The Overall Importance of Each Dimension translate us the (average) weight that subjects 
attribute to it e.g., the relevance of that dimension in subject’s perception of stimuli. Equal 
weights mean that subjects tend to balance criteria in perceiving stimuli, unequal weights mean 
they (relatively) emphasise some of it, only.   
 
Table 3 - Resume of computations 
 
Young          
S-Stress




No.of subjects (163) (163) (163) Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4 Dim 5 Dim 6
No. of dimensions 1
2 Error: possible linear dependencies among specified variables
3 0,2146 0,14044 0,70944 0,2866 0,2518 0,1711
4 0,15596 0,08347 0,75405 0,2454 0,1833 0,1648 0,1605
5 Error: possible linear dependencies among specified variables
6 0,08153 0,04225 0,7904 0,2063 0,1562 0,1428 0,1103 0,097 0,0779
No.of subjects (42) (42) (42) Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4 Dim 5 Dim 6
No. of dimensions 1
2 0,26902 0,19557 0,74163 0,4091 0,3326
3 0,19772 0,15817 0,74488 0,3192 0,2841 0,1416
4 0,14177 0,08519 0,81405 0,2805 0,2199 0,1584 0,1553
5 0,09993 0,0543 0,84962 0,294 0,186 0,1598 0,1413 0,068
6 0,07019 0,03682 0,85678 0,2514 0,2216 0,1186 0,0948 0,084 0,0866
No.of subjects (20) (20) (20) Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4 Dim 5 Dim 6
No. of dimensions 1
2 0,22533 0,16607 0,81621 0,417 0,3992
3 0,14116 0,10666 0,87859 0,41 0,2927 0,1759
4 0,10273 0,06496 0,91035 0,3334 0,2724 0,2091 0,0954
5 0,07759 0,06346 0,91552 0,2619 0,2269 0,1904 0,1095 0,127
6 0,04192 0,02321 0,95916 0,3705 0,1816 0,123 0,0941 0,077 0,1127
No.of subjects (62) (62) (62) Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4 Dim 5 Dim 6
No. of dimensions 1
2 Error: possible linear dependencies among specified variables
3 0,21627 0,15576 0,69071 0,2785 0,2263 0,186
4 Error: possible linear dependencies among specified variables
5 0,12043 0,06288 0,76931 0,2118 0,1771 0,1594 0,1157 0,105
6 0,08059 0,0415 0,79024 0,2027 0,1743 0,1372 0,1094 0,088 0,0783
No.of subjects (39) (39) (39) Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4 Dim 5 Dim 6
No. of dimensions 1
2 0,30555 0,2324 0,63434 0,3658 0,2686
3 0,22178 0,14311 0,68802 0,2565 0,2199 0,2115
4 0,15804 0,08621 0,75764 0,2528 0,1829 0,1684 0,1536
5 0,11946 0,0635 0,79026 0,1812 0,1895 0,165 0,1274 0,127
* 6 0,08008 0,0456 0,85745 0,2 0,1779 0,1814 0,1255 0,089 0,084
* The total number of parameters being estimated was large relative to the number of data values in data matrix. Results may not be reliable.




































Table 3 - Resume of computations (cont.) 
 
 
A broad agreement appeared across sub-samples, concerning most parameters of the model. As 
sub-samples mutually intercept, we could fairly expect being able to use a unique solution in 
describing Perception. From a psychological point a view it seemed, therefore, that subjects had 
“experimented” and reacted to the questionnaire in a (roughly) compatible way.  
The following step was to choose the “right” dimensionality e.g., which number of dimensions to 
use to represent Perception. Choosing the “right” solution about dimensionality is always 
problematic, and as much a substantive as a statistical question (KRUSKAL and WISH, 1978, p48). 
Arabie Carrol and DeSarbo (1987, p35) refer that there are no universally accepted criteria, only 
various strategies; thus, substantive interpretability of dimensions, focused on both the stimuli and 
subjects space, is often what allow us to decide about dimensionality. They also state tradition to be, 
in ALSCAL, to look for the “elbow” in plot decrements in S-Stress, as we consider solutions in 
successively higher dimensions. 
In Appendix B, we plot S-Stress as the number of dimensions increase, for all sub-samples (Section 
2, pages 103-105). As there was no clear “elbow” in graphs, we should use other criteria. These 
could include, for instance, “rule of thumb” proportions between number of stimuli (I) and 
number of dimensions (R) to adopt, rule being I  4R, but the rule usually applies the way around 
e.g., to previously determine the number of stimuli. In addition, it applies mostly to non-weighted 
MDS analysis, as WMDS models have distinct characteristics (KRUSKAL and WISH, 1978, p63). 
Moreover, empirically published studies using weighted MDS models have tended toward higher 
dimensionalities than in non-weighted ones (ARABIE, CARROLL and DeSARBO, 1987, p37).   
No.of subjects (81) (81) (81) Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4 Dim 5 Dim 6
No. of dimensions 1
2 0,298 0,21092 0,66502 0,3426 0,3224
3 0,21244 0,13936 0,71651 0,2994 0,2719 0,1453
4 0,16366 0,08975 0,73756 0,2549 0,1649 0,1594 0,1584
5 0,12278 0,06514 0,76126 0,2339 0,1493 0,1338 0,1416 0,103
6 0,07988 0,04165 0,80323 0,2859 0,1344 0,1158 0,1042 0,085 0,0779
No.of subjects (82) (82) (82) Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4 Dim 5 Dim 6
No. of dimensions 1
2 0,30194 0,20965 0,6607 0,3327 0,328
3 0,21254 0,13905 0,71948 0,2882 0,2149 0,2164
4 0,14638 0,07898 0,78054 0,2446 0,202 0,1674 0,1666
5 0,11034 0,05826 0,81166 0,2457 0,1809 0,1633 0,1324 0,089
















































It was necessary, then, to check for stability in configuration of stimuli, among different sets of 
dimensions and across different sub-samples e.g., among all models. Here the analysis was 
exploratory, and a clear and stable configuration was important, because interpretation and 
subsequent computations would follow.  
Stability was a difficult goal, however, because no equal solutions existed among sub-samples, only 
(sometimes very) similar ones. Visually comparing the configuration of stimuli among all 
sub-samples, in models with 2 to 6 dimensions, and as in WMDS dimensions can be permuted and 
reflected, the solution with 4 dimensions (or the first 4 dimensions of a 5D solution when the 
previous couldn’t be extracted) appeared as reasonably stable. Figures 3 and 4 show it, considering 






                                                 
34 To avoid cluttering, we only show on these figures two objects from each author.   






























Several key points deserved further consideration, however. 
To begin with, although in non-weighted MDS we can interpret the relative length of the stimuli 
space dimensions as indicating their relative importance, that cannot be done in weighted MDS (as 
ALSCAL is), because dimensions are arbitrarily normalised to be equal. The relative importance is 
found in average weights on a dimension, rather than in the spread of stimuli coordinates 
(YOUNG and HARRIS, 1996, p152), and ALSCAL always corresponds, by “default”, the higher 
weight to the 1st dimension, the next to the second, etc. According to Table 3, however, weights 
were not very different, between dimensions; therefore, we could read Figures 3 and 4 almost as 
normal graphs. Consequently, and because stimuli near the origin are being poorly represented in 
the model 35, each dimension was (approximately) defined by the stimuli of only two authors. 
Solution allowed us to consider, then, that (fundamental) differences in stimuli had been recognised 
in, or attributed to, essentially, four specific (and independent) pair of authors, therefore apparently 
translating four logical inferences about stimuli. Whether the assumption was reasonable e.g., 
                                                 
35 Only Ross Lovegrove and Charles R. Mackintosh, for instance, are relevant in defining Dimension 1, because all other authors have 
near zero coordinates on this axis e.g., they are “irrelevant” to the axis. Similar reasoning applies to all other dimensions.  




























inferences corresponded to some substantive reality in stimuli, and whether we could, or not, 
decipher those inferences, was always problematic, because no additional information was available 
regarding stimuli properties, as seen by subjects. Besides, even if it were, it would probably lead us 
to an exceedingly complex analysis in light of this work scope. Our goal was, simply, to find a 
“frame” allowing us to study another variable (Affect), not to find an “absolute” frame on itself. In 
other words, the frame would be essentially instrumental, and this work was only exploratory. Even 
so, if we could interpret dimensions results would certainly be better, namely because of our final 
objective – gathering useful elements to support a new brand. Model validity and reliability were, 
then, important, before attempting an interpretation. 
Recalling the procedure yields results in two main components, both expressed in the same set of 
axes (dimensions), and which we can name and think of as (YOUNG and HARRIS, 1996, p145): 
a) The Subjects Space - information that is unique to each subject about the structure of the 
stimuli. 
b) The Stimuli Space - information that subjects share about the structure of the stimuli. 




The Subjects Space shows us the relative position of subjects according to each individual point of 
view. The ALSCAL algorithm builds this space representing, as vectors, the adjustment of 
geometric distances to raw data (RSQ), for each individual, while simultaneously orienting these 
vectors according to weights subjects attribute to axes. Figure 5 shows a part of that space, using 
Dimensions 1 and 4, and compares subjects of different countries 36.  
As we can see, sub-samples do not obviously differ – among themselves – in what concerns to 
vector length (RSQ), but the angle of most vectors with Dimension 1 tends to be smaller than the 
one they have with Dimension 4, Portuguese subjects in particular e.g., subjects attribute a higher 
weight to Dimension 1. 
 
                                                 
36 As detailed in Table 3, all dimensions have approximately the same weight. Therefore, we only choose Dimensions 1 and 4 because 
they have a (slightly) higher difference among it, than the others.    
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Figure 5  
Subject’s Weight, by Country 
 
Validity implies that our measure do measures what we want (BRYMAN and CRAMER, 1990, 
p91). As stated, we had not specified, “a priori”, possible sources of variation among stimuli; 
therefore, as long as our model (geometric) distances accurately translated subject’s (numeric) 
answers, as they had given it in questionnaires, we would be consistently representing those 
answers. From a psychological perspective, then, we would be correctly describing subject’s 
Perception - whatever it could possible be - and, if so, the model would necessarily be valid. As, 
according to Table 3, (average) RSQ was high in almost all dimensionalities, we had no special 




The Stimuli Space (Figures 3 and 4) shows us fundamental (and latent) differences in stimuli, as all 
subjects see it (or each sub-sample if we consider a partial analysis). The ALSCAL algorithm builds 
this space blending and averaging, in a single map, all stimuli space of all individuals, but accounting 
in the process for the way each of these spaces individually fit to original data. This way, Stimuli 
Space represents only what subjects have in common, and the contribution of each subject to it is 
Note: Vectors start at the origin, ending at each point.



























determined so much by subject own space, as by the way it agrees with subject’s original data 
(RSQ). In other words, Stimuli Space is a weighted space. 
Reliability concerns the consistency of a measure, and it can have more than a single meaning 
(BRYMAN and CRAMER, 1990, p88-91). For instance, it can be external e.g., related to measure 
consistency in time, and internal e.g., related with the consistency of the measure among subjects 
themselves. The latter was our case, and we could see the question in two ways: at the individual, 
and at the sub-sample level 37. 
At an individual level, we could ask how well each (individual) stimuli space (e.g., perceptual map) 
was, in fact, similar to the (common) Stimuli Space of figures 3 and 4. As (average) RSQ was high, 
the only remaining source of possible differences, between subjects, was weights subjects attributed 
to dimensions. Now, ALSCAL yields a specific index - the “Weirdness” index - that describe us 
how different each subject is from the “typical subject”. This index varies between 0 and 1: a 
subject with a “Weirdness” of zero does not differ from the “typical one”, but if he has a 
“Weirdness” of one he is very atypical. Figure 6 shows how this index varied across countries and 
Appendix B further details it (Section 2, pages 110-111). 
Figure 6 
Weirdness, by Country 
 
                                                 
37 Situations do not coincide. To see this, consider the following example: all subjects in a sample can share a characteristic, say, 
wearing a brown tie, but those in a particular subset of this sample can also share a much more visible one, for instance, wearing a 























As we can see, a strong agreement existed between subjects: median values, and ranges, are similar 
in all countries. From this perspective, then, the (common) Stimuli Space was stable. 
At the sub-sample level, however, the question was much more complex, because no standardised 
procedure was available allowing us to compare, directly, Stimuli Spaces of different sub-samples.  
Visual interpretation of these spaces had already given us some support in favour of its stability, but 
we had no test to check if, or when, a particular difference among spaces was significant, in 
statistical terms, and spaces were indeed different, sometimes. As some (analytical) confirmation 
was important, and we would need to compare Affect in sub-samples, later on, using Perception as 
a “common ground”, we resorted to an indirect method.      
We used, then, Kendall Tau-b 38 and Wilcoxon 39 tests to compare, on one side, stimuli coordinates 
of personal spaces when we included subjects in a given sub-sample, with, on another, stimuli 
coordinates of personal spaces when the same subjects were part of the total sample. In other 
words, we wanted to check if figures 3 and 4 translated something also existing at the sub-sample 
level, although eventually distorted by “local” factors. If visual interpretation were correct e.g., if the 
(common) Stimuli Space shown in figures 3 and 4 were stable across sub-samples, some stability 
would also exist at the personal level, because subjects were the same. Additionally, differences 
between sub-samples would have its origin, most probably, on other questions like RSQ or relative 
weights. This way, may be we could contribute to: 
(1) Confirm the stability of figures 3 and 4, considering we had previously admitted it based only 
on visual interpretation, and over the assumption of being irrelevant to reflect axes. 
(2) Reveal, in turn, specific differences among sub-samples resulting from axes permutation. In 
fact, axes have associated weights, and although we can permute it from the point of view of 
stimuli configuration, if sub-samples differ on axis order, they differ on the relative importance 
subjects’ attribute to dimensions. Moreover, such differences could be useful for other studies, 
such as those more specifically exploring cultural differences.    
Appendix B shows comparisons involving all sub-samples (Section 2, pages 106-109).  
                                                 
38
 Kendall Tau-b is a non-parametric measure of association, for ordinal or ranked variables, that take ties into account. The sign of  
the coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship, and its absolute value indicates the strength, with larger absolute values 
indicating stronger relationships. Possible values range from -1 to 1, but a value of -1 or +1 can only be obtained from square 
tables. 
39 Wilcoxon test is a non-parametric procedure used with two related variables, to test the hypothesis that the two variables have the 
same distribution. It makes no assumptions about the shapes of the distributions of the two variables. 
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In general, Kendall tests confirmed our assumption, but Wilcoxon tests did not. In Kendall tests 
high levels of significance appeared, whenever a given pair of dimensions “matched” the 
assumption of equality derived from visual interpretation, but we did not confirm such 
correspondence with Wilcoxon tests. Considering the stimuli configuration shown in Figures 3 and 
4 we could admit, then, that sub-samples differed in the relative importance attributed to 
dimensions, and these, in turn, usually involved the same particular stimuli. Still, we could not be 
sure that subjects in sub-samples differed, only, on the specific criteria that allowed ALSCAL to 
yield the stimuli configuration of Figures 3 and 4, when jointly considering them all, although those 
criteria would be probably relevant to our analysis. 
Table 4 resumes differences in sub-samples, taking as reference the stimuli configuration of Figures 




All summed, we admitted that subject’s Perception could be reasonably described using a 4D 
ALSCAL solution, as the one of Figures 3 and 4. 
Interpreting dimensions was the final question. Tradition is to use additional information, taking its 
measures as dependent of stimuli coordinates, and using multiple regression procedures to label 
Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Dimension 3 Dimension 4
(Mack. vs. Loveg.) (Siza vs. Arad) (Aalto vs. Stark) (Gerhy vs. Citt.)
TOTAL sample 1 2 3 4
Portugal 1 3 2 4
Italy 1 3 2 4
Sweden 1 2 - 3
Japan 1 4 3 2
Males 4 3 1 2
Females 1 2 3 4
Age < 35 y 1 2 4 3
Age > 35 y - - 3 4
"Low" education 1 3 2 4
"High" education 3 4 1 2
Social Sciences 1 2 3 4
Natural Sciences 1 3 2 4
Linguistics 2 3 4 1
Arts 2 1 4 3
Questionnaires with Names 1 3 2 4
Questionnaires without Names 1 2 4 3
Ranks of Dimension's Importance, across sub-samples
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model dimensions according to results (KRUSKAL and WISH, 1978, p36; ARABIE, CARROLL 
and DeSARBO, 1987, p37). This implies, of course, we previously determine the relevant 
information to use, but here, instead, that was precisely what we wanted to explore. Differently 
stated, here we should use common and intuitive reasoning to label dimensions, and only further 
research would allow - eventually - to determine subjects implicit criteria with more acceptable 
“precision” 40. Accordingly, interpretation was as follow: 
 
Dim. 1 - Mackintosh vs. Lovegrove… Formalism: the “structure”, “proportion” 
and “line” in Mackintosh, vs. the object 
“casualty” in Lovegrove. 
Dim. 2 - Siza vs. Arad……………… Geometry + Materials: the “austere” in 
wooden lines, in Siza, vs. the “humour” in 
metallic curves, in Arad. 
Dim. 3 - Aalto vs. Starck…………… Colour, if we take the iconic level in 
representation: “less precise” in Aalto vs. 
“obvious” in Starck. 
Modernity, if we consider the symbolic 
one: the “old look” in Aalto vs. the “new 
look” in Starck. 
Dim. 4 - Citterio vs. Gerhy………… Type (in the sense of the production 
mode): the “industrial” in Citterio, vs. the 
“one-off” in Gerhy. 
 
 
We can make, of course, more elaborate and equally valid interpretations, but questions such as 
how high were subjects’ abstraction levels in judgements, or how “conscious” it has, remain. 
Indeed these characteristics are usually part of a much longer list of characteristics that might just as 
plausibly have appeared (KRUSKAL and WISH, 1978, p35).    
 
                                                 
40 See also the results discussion (Chapter 4).  
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3.4.2 – Affect 
 
We proceeded, next, attempting to confirm if we could scale subjects concerning their Affect to 
stimuli involved. 
If questions used in survey were correct, we should be able to confirm it as valid and reliable 
measures of a (latent) variable Affect. We used, then, Principal Component Analysis (in SPSS v.9), 
to find out if we could explain the variance of these answers by a single, unique underlying measure, 
representing the concept of respondents Affect. 
As we show in Appendix B examples (Section 3, pages 112-135) 41, where we also include scatter 
diagrams, in all situations we could extract one component explaining a minimum of 79% of 
variance, “eigenvalues” being always higher then 1,0. The first question (“I like one, or more, of these 
furniture pieces”) was, in more than 50% of the cases, the one better represented in components 
extracted, and the second one (“I like the style of its author”) the alternative, almost always. As 
these components well represented all questions, we confirmed measure Validity (CARMINES and 
ZELLER, 1979, p62). 
We computed, then, “Alpha de Cronbach” values (“if item deleted”: CARMINES and ZELLER, 
1979, p44-45), and found it usually superior to 0,80, with a few between 0,7 and 0,8. Thus, we 
could also be sure of measure Reliability. 
Consequently, we could use an aggregate measure of these answers in measuring the underlying 
concept of subjects’ Affect, and we choose the mean value of it. Our measure of Affect became, 
then, for each respondent: 
 
 
Figures 7a and 7b show Affect distribution among respondents that did not know authors’ name 
(Fig. 7a), and among those who knew it (figure 7b) 42, using “Boxplot” 43 by country of survey and 
designer involved 44. Appendix B presents other summary tables (Section 4, pages 136-144), also 
                                                 
41 Appendix B shows only examples, because the whole computation’s output is large. 
42 We can only assume probabilistic situations, of course, concerning authors identification by respondents   
43 Boxplots show the median, the interquartile range, outliers, and extreme cases of individual variables. 












As we can see on these figures, variations of Affect roughly follow the same pattern, across 
countries: an unclear “U shaped” relative position of boxes, with centres (median values) usually 
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inside the 3-5 interval e.g., a “prudent evaluation” from consumers, although the entire set of 
opinions, about a particular author, frequently ranges the whole scale e.g., it strongly varies. Italians 
were an exception, however, because those who did not knew authors’ names (generally) “disliked” 
all objects (fig. 7a). In addition, “consensus” was higher in Italy too, among those who instead 
knew it (fig. 7b), because the range of opinions here, concerning each of the stimuli, was smaller. By 
contrast, divergence of opinions was higher among Portuguese subjects, compared with subjects 
from other countries, especially about Siza and Mackintosh objects. 
In general, subjects that knew authors’ names (fig. 7b) tended to give higher scores compared with 
those who knew not (fig. 7a), namely over Citterio, Gerhy, Stark and Arad objects and if we take 
median values, but in Aalto they followed the inverse pattern and, in Italy, they were particularly 
“severe” with Siza. Preferences mostly went to Aalto, than, in subjects with less information (fig. 
7a), but Portuguese has preferred Citterio, instead, when names were available in judgement, and 
Japanese favoured Stark, in turn (fig. 7b).     
 
3.4.3 – Framing Affect with Perception 
 
Having scaled Perception and Affect, we finally turned to our initial question: to understand if, and 
when, “the aesthetic” changed, eventually uncovering one, or more, potential brands.  
Because we used a non-probability sample, the derivation of the sample distribution of various 
statistics was unknown, and statistical inference using it - with the goal of generalising to 
population(s) involved - was impossible (HENKEL, 1976). Still, we could check for some key 
variations compatible with our exploratory approach; although only valid inside our sample, it could 
give us, nevertheless, useful indications to future analysis. 
Three “steps” were important in answering our question:  
(1) To know whether Affect and Perception had (internally) compatible distributions e.g., if 
variations in Affect broadly followed those of Perception, given our theoretical starting point.  
(2) To know the relevance of our sub-sampling criteria(s) in explaining subjects’ (differences in) 
Affect. 
(3) To know if our experimental condition, confronting iconic and symbolic appraisals, revealed 
some (differential) effect concerning authors included.   
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To solve the first one we needed tests, allowing us to confront Affect among stimuli (or authors) 
involved; if we were right, we could reasonably expect significant differences - at least - inside each 
pair of authors defining Perception dimensions. However, we could only use parametric tests of 
significance, like the t-test for the difference-of-means, if distributions followed normality or 
sample’s size were large. Morh (1990, p61), for instance, suggests a sub-group size greater than 40 
to conduct such tests. As results confirmed significant departures from normality, and sub-samples 
size were modest, we had to use non-parametric tests of significance - where normal distribution 
condition is relaxed - and Friedman tests 45 were the choice. 
Table 5 summarises results, by sub-sample.  
 
Table 5 - Affect comparison among authors  
 
Considering the whole sample (the first line of Table 5), we can see that Affect distributions 
regarding, for instance, Lovegrove and Mackintosh, were significantly different, the probability of 
such a difference to occur being equal, or inferior, to 3,5%. Thus, when we accounted for the other 
tests, we confirmed that Affect followed variations, among stimuli, that were compatible with our 
model of Perception e.g., Affect and Perception obeyed, somehow, to a common “structure”. This 
suggested us variables were related, fairly supporting our departure point. Still, at the sub-sample 
level (the other lines of Table 5) results were ambiguous, as what happened previously with model 
stability in Perception (see Reliability questions in Perception – page 50/53). 
The following “step” was, now, to find out which of our criteria in defining sub-samples (Country, 
                                                 
45 Friedman test is the non-parametric equivalent of a one-sample repeated measures design, or a two-way analysis of variance with 
one observation per cell. It tests the null hypothesis that k related variables come from the same population. 
Lovegrove vs. Mackintosh Siza vs. Arad Stark vs. Aalto Gerhy vs. Citterio
TOTAL sample 0.035 0.006 0.001 0.000
Portugal 0.273 0.724 0.739 0.086
Italy 0.001 0.002 0.808 0.001
Sweden 0.058 0.174 0.000 0.043
Japan 0.450 0.033 0.289 0.002
Friedman Tests Levels of Significance  *
* Greyed cells show probabilities smaller than 0,05 e.g., test results with a weak possibility of occuring by hazard. In 
other words, results we may fairly pressupose with "cause(s)".  
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Age, Gender, etc), if any, was relevant to explain the variations we had found in Affect (Table 5, 
total sample), and to that we had to relate Affect with artificial (categorical) variables that would 
classify subjects according to sub-samples. We should relate, then, an ordinal variable (Affect) with 
categorical ones (country of origin, gender, etc.), and we used Categorical Regression with Optimal 
Scaling (CATREG) 46 to do it. 
As we can see on Table 6, such criteria were (globally) relevant to explain Affect variations, because 
Anova results were clearly significant (Sig. = 0.000), but Table 7 also showed us that only 
differences in codification, and country of origin, were individually important (Standardized Beta 
coefficients clearly different from zero: 0,141 and –0,201). 
 
Table 6 - Sub-sampling relevance to Affect variations  
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In other words, results suggested that we could explain our dependent variable (Affect) in light of 
independent variables like, for instance, the respondent’s country of origin, its gender, age or 
                                                 
46 CATREG extends the standard approach - Linear Regression - by simultaneously scaling nominal, ordinal, and numerical variables. 
The procedure quantifies categorical variables such that quantification’s reflect characteristics of the original categories. The 
procedure treats quantified categorical variables in the same way as numerical variables. Using non-linear transformations, it allows 
variables to be analysed at a variety of levels to find the best fitting model. 
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working field; however, only the country of origin, and the fact of knowing or not author’s name, 
seemed to deserve a practical consideration, in this study.  
We could finally try, now, to answer our basic question. Our goal was to detect if “the aesthetic” 
changed, according to available information and in a given context. Consequently, we should 
confirm if Affect changed according to whether subjects knew, or not, authors name, other 
conditions being similar, namely Perception. Therefore, we had to: 
- Confront subject’s Perception between these sub-samples. 
- Relate subject’s Affect with it. 
- Check for possible variations of Affect. 
- Find out if we could locate it, thus uncovering (eventual) brand(s). 
From Tables 3 and 6, and correlations in Appendix B (Section 2, pages 106-107), we already knew 
subject’s Perception was (approximately) similar in these sub-samples, but Figures 8 and 9 directly 
confront it, ignoring dimension’s weight. As we can see on these figures, Perception was similar on 
these groups, and our 4D model (Fig. 3 and 4) roughly applied to both.  
 
Figure 8 – Experimental Groups confrontation 
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Figure 9 – Experimental Groups confrontation (cont.) 
 
To further relate, now, Affect with Perception, we could use multiple regressions. Regression of 
external information in a scaling space is often very helpful, because it enhances interpretability of 
this space. External information usually represents a property that subjects more or less recognise in 
stimuli, and two models exist in this regard: the vector model, and the “ideal point” model 
(YOUNG and HAMER, 1994, p200-201). The former is most meaningful when stimuli possess 
neither too much, nor too little, of the attribute. The latter, instead, is most useful when stimuli 
contain either too much, or too little, of the same attribute. Both models find the direction, through 
the multidimensional space, that corresponds best to increasing amounts of the attribute, but the 
latter also allow us to determine an “ideal” amount of it. Therefore, we usually adopt both 
procedures in attempts to label dimensions, or as a guide to dimensionality, when (enough) external 
information is available (KRUSKAL and WISH, 1978, p35-36, Appendix A, ARABIE, CARROLL 
and DeSARBO, 1987, p36). 
Here, however, we had slightly different concerns: 
- We did not wanted to interpret a space (Perception), given an “objective” property of stimuli, 
nor Affect was a property of stimuli but, instead, a subject’s reaction to - presumably - many of 
those properties. Still, projecting Affect on this space would probably allow us to understand if, 
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and how, we could relate it with Perception, and that would clearly increase our understanding 
of subject’s opinion.  
- More important, such a projection would represent Affect under an “objective” frame of 
reference. As this frame was reasonably stable, across sub-samples, we would have, 
approximately, a “Ceteris Paribus” condition, allowing us to analyse (eventual) variations of 
Affect among it. 
As ALSCAL results are metric, but our measures of Affect were not, we used CATREG again to 
relate Affect with the stimuli coordinates of Perception. Appendix B describes these computations 
(Section 5, pages 145-157). 
Correlations between measures of Affect and Perception were not high, as we can see on 
Appendix B – from 0,22 in Japan up to 0,44 in Italy (Section 5, pages 145-149). Most ANOVA 
results, however, were significant at levels higher that 0.05, therefore suggesting that measures 
could be confronted. 
Consequently, we used the regression coefficients to find out on Perception space which directions 
translated increasing values of Affect.  
Figures 10 and 11 show the resulting graphics, when we compare countries. Vector lengths 
represent the (relative) importance of a pair of Perception dimensions, in explaining variations of 
Affect; vectors orientation, in turn, translates the (relative) weight of each dimension, inside that 
pair. As an example, in Figure 10 dimensions 1 and 2 roughly explain the same variation in Affect, 
if we compare Swedish with Japanese, and both dimensions seem to be weakly related with it (small 
vectors). Even so, Geometry/Materials (Dim. 2) were “more important” to Japanese subjects than 
the Formalism of objects involved (Dim. 1), if we search for high aesthetic judgements (or the 
inverse in Sweden). By contrast (Fig. 11), we can better explain Affect variations using criteria such 
as the Colour/Modernity (Dim.3), or the Type of furniture (Dim. 4), and consequently vectors are 
bigger. Accordingly, Swedish emphasised “soft colours” and an “old look”, when aesthetic 
judgements were higher, and Japanese “preferred” a more “industrial” appearance, in equivalent 
situations. Another possible interpretation is to consider that the influence of Arad to (positive) 
aesthetic judgements, in Japan, was “equivalent” to the influence that Mackintosh had in Sweden; 
still, in both countries such influence was smaller than the one they exerted on Italy 47.  
                                                 
47 Assuming, of course, we stay inside this set of 8 authors. Thus, the first interpretation is clearly preferable.  
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Figure 10 – Affect vs. Perception 
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Figure 11 – Affect vs. Perception (cont.) 
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The black vector (total), in turn, applies to the whole sample of people, regardless of its country of 
origin, and it translates a broad “underlying tendency” that is common to all respondents. 
As we can also see, all countries have (approximately) the same “pattern” concerning Affect to 
stimuli involved e.g., all vectors (roughly) point to similar directions in space (the same “quadrant”). 
Affect seems to relate more with Dim. 3 (Colour/Modernity) and 4 (Type), than with Dim. 1 
(Formalism) or 2 (Geometry/Material). Portugal and Italy seem to be exceptions however, 
regarding these latter dimensions, in Portugal because of vector orientation (the opposite direction), 
and in Italy due to vector length (much bigger).  
Repeating the procedure, we then confronted subjects according to whether they knew, or not, 
author’s name, inside each of these countries, using again Friedman tests to verify if such answers 
were (significantly) different, for each stimuli considered. Appendix B (Section 5, pages 150-157) 
shows us that correlations between measures (Affect vs. Perception) were similar, on each of these 
groups, to those we had found of each country, as a whole. Italy was an exception, however, and 
correlation grew up to 0,67 in the sub-sample where subjects knew authors’ name. 
Figures 12 to 19, in turn, summarise results. We emphasise some names on these figures, using 
capitals and a box, when Friedman tests were significant e.g., distributions of Affect (confronting 
experimental groups) had differences that – unless explained as brand component(s) – were statistically 
improbable 48. 
According to the same figures, vectors size and orientation is different, between subjects that did 
not knew author’s name and those that instead knew it: light blue vectors vs. dark blue ones, 
respectively, and some of these differences were, indeed, confirmed by significant Friedman tests. 
In other words, we found the following effects, which we describe in a sequence that tries to help 
the reader: 
 
- In ITALY (Figures 12 and 13), knowing the names of Aalto, and Arad, apparently led 
respondents to different affective answers, thus “pushing” vector’s orientation accordingly: 
towards Arad (fig. 12), and Aalto (fig. 13), respectively.  
 
                                                 
48 It may be useful to recall, here, that we are taking brand(s) as a differential effect, as seen by consumers (pages 29-30). We must keep in 
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Aesthetic judgements, thus, seem to reflect the influence of some additional knowledge, here 
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“brought in” by these names 49, and Friedman tests support this perspective, because group 
differ in correspondent evaluations. 
 
- In SWEDEN (Figures 14 and 15), aesthetic opinions revealed the importance of Formalism 
(Dim. 1) and Geometry/Materials (Dim. 2), when names were available, and “pushed” vector 
in Arad’s direction, but emphasis went to Colour/Modernity (Dim. 3), in both group.  
 
Figure 14 
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49 Figure 13 does not reflect Gerhy’s influence on judgements, because group diverge too, in face of his name, and vector does not 
changes accordingly. As we can see, however, in figures 7a and 7b, it was Citterio simultaneous difference in values, even bigger 
than the one of Gerhy, the reason to vector “stability” among Italian groups. Now: under these circumstances shouldn’t we find a 
difference too, in Italy, when comparing Citterio’s evaluations? After all Citterio is an Italian designer and, as Figure 7b shows, 
evaluations were clearly higher among subjects who knew his name. The “contradiction” fades, however, if we also remember the 
following: 
a) Figure 12 and 13 show a tendency of numeric values, when we consider Affect as an interval variable. Friedman tests, in turn, 
focus on values distribution and if we only take it as ordinal. Thus, results may or not “coincide”, in the sense of what we are 
looking for e.g., group may differ, in fact, in the subset of the scale each chooses to use in survey, but simultaneously present 
equivalent distributions of values. As stated (page 43), hardly we can take Affect as an interval variable (at least strictly…), 
therefore we emphasise its ordinal nature, here, when pointing out the differences.  
b) More important, perhaps, non-parametric tests are always less powerful than its parametric “equivalent”. Therefore, it may 
underestimate situations that we would refer otherwise. Citterio may be an example, here, and we are probably taking too 
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In addition, results suggest that names were irrelevant to subjects’ affective answer, according 
to Friedman tests. Still, we could be facing the following, instead: whether all subjects perfectly 
knew all objects, and therefore names were necessarily redundant 50 or, which seemed a more 
plausible situation, not only Aalto’s objects, per se, could be widely familiar to Swedish (after all, 
he was a Finn designer…) as, also, it could unusually “match” their taste, too. 
Now, subjects’ evaluations of Aalto were usually different, in all countries, from those of all 
other authors, if names were not available in questionnaires. Consequently, and if we were right, 
answers regarding Aalto should kept this difference, in Sweden, even if names were available, 
and Friedman tests indeed suggest it (Appendix B, Section 6, page 159) 51.  
In other words, Aalto’s effect may be, here, the difference we find on his answers if we 
compare it with (almost) all the others, regardless of the group we consider. 
                                                 
50 The inverse situation of not knowing all objects and names seems highly improbable, here. 
51 Interestingly, exceptions should come from authors inside Dim. 1, or 2, because Affect also relates with it, and we did confirm it in 
Siza and Arad (Dim.2), who were – both – better evaluated (Fig. 7b). Thus, vector still points to Mackintosh, in figure 14, though it 
simply translates the difference he shows to Lovegrove, in the opposite side of Dim. 1. 
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- In JAPAN (Figures 16 and 17), and according to Friedman tests, only the name of Stark 
apparently caused the kind of effect we are translating as “brand”.  
Figure 16 
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In figures 16 and 17, however, vector “movement” may induce us in error. In fact, while 
subjects who did not saw his name tended to prefer “soft colours” (and/or an “old look”), 
under Dimension 3, subjects’ who instead saw it also appreciated the opposite e.g., stronger 
colours and/or a “contemporary look” 52. Consequently, the vector of the first group shows us 
the relevance of Geometry/Materials (Dim.2), Colour/Modernity (Dim.3), and Type (Dim. 4), 
in subject’s aesthetics. By contrast, however, the vector of the latter group tends to show us, 
only, the influence of Geometry/Materials (Dim.2) and Type (Dim. 4), because the model do 
not conveys a possible (and important?) tendency in subjects’ opinion:  one discriminating both 
Aalto and Stark from the others 53.  
 
- In PORTUGAL, finally (Figures 18 and 19), we see that subjects who did not knew authors’ 
names preferred “informal” objects (in Dim.1), those with “soft colours/old look” (in Dim. 3), 
or even those with an “industrial look” (in Dim.2), given our stimuli set. Curiously, however, 
the ANOVA result was not significant in subjects who knew authors’ name. Consequently, 
their answers are harder to interpret, because we cannot relate Affect with Perception on them. 
Still, we can nevertheless conclude that: 
 
a) Subjects were less “typical”, concerning our Perception model e.g., they do differ from the 
others in the way they discriminate among objects (see the Weirdness index in Appendix B, 
Section 2, page 110 – Questionnaires with names). Thus, our (4D) model do not represents 
them so well 54. 
                                                 
52 We can easily see this if we look at Figure 7b, where we note that the highest medians are those of Aalto and Stark, simultaneously. 
Thus, subjects who did not knew author’s names established a difference, between Stark and Aalto, which seemed to loose its 
importance, in aesthetic terms, if names were available; consequently, our current 4D model cannot graphically represent it (the 
vector cannot simultaneously follow “opposite” directions – Stark and Aalto). It may be useful to recall, here, our reference to Van 
Schuur (page 39) concerning the number of Dimensions that simultaneously “operate”, in a given situation.   
53 Accordingly, and as Appendix B also shows (Section 2, page 111), the Weirdness index is “different” in Japan, among the two 
group involved, and our model “fits” worst – somehow – to subjects who saw names in the questionnaires than it “fits” to the 
others. 
54 In fact, subjects who saw names in the questionnaires tended to be more “prudent” than the other ones, and medians of this group 
(Fig. 7b) show a kind of “neutrality” to authors involved (the value of 4). In a sense, then, subjects do not show a tendency at all, 
concerning positive aesthetic evaluations, and the group is (mostly) “indifferent” to stimuli; therefore, Affect do not relates with 
Perception, and we should expect such ANOVA results, too. Even so, Friedman test was significant regarding Gerhy’s evaluations, 
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b) In addition, if we increase (or decrease) the number of model dimensions, Affect and 
Perception still do not relate with each other, even if we look inside different partitions of 







                                                 
55 We do not present these computations here, to avoid “data overload”, but subjects do differ on answers, inside each of the group, 
because the range of opinions is high (see, for instance, Siza and Mackintosh, in Fig. 7b). Beyond our current model, then, we may 
need to build function(s) (eventually) able to discriminate, for instance, those who liked an author from those who, instead, did not, 
but we avoided this reasoning, here, because sample size was small. 
 
 72 
C h a p t e r  4  
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
As described, we attempted to deal in this work with questions that certainly are not short, or easy. 
Therefore and to help the reader, along with our conclusions we recall, and synthesize, our 
departure perspective(s). The reader may, or not, agree with both, and discussion is always 
welcome; yet, starting perspectives undoubtedly frame the kind of conclusions we may possible 
draw.  
In many senses, we all intimately know what a brand is, and we immediately recognise the kind of 
aesthetics its object(s) involve, at least currently and if they are tangible, in particular. We do not 
confound a Mercedes and a Citroen car, a Timberland pair of shoes with an Ecco pair, a Swatch 
and a Cartier watch, or a Grundfos submergible pump with an Efacec equivalent, fortunately (both 
for us, and to its producers). Each is a brand that involves products with its own aesthetic, 
independently of the endless differences products may also exhibit, and either brands or aesthetics 
are powerful mechanism, indeed, which – at the very least – are present in one of our most 
important life tasks: to differentiate things in order to think, choose, and act. 
Yet, the moment we try to analyse, define, or operate with these concepts – brands or “the 
aesthetic”, quite complex questions appear, and we discover that, in many other senses too, may be 
we do not know, so well as we could expect, what they mean. Is it what we see or have seen, like 
the product itself, the brand name, and the use situations in both, or is it what we conclude after 
that, for instance physical characteristics or derived psychological ones? Is it what we have learned 
by ourselves, like “reasons”, perspectives, and details, or is it what others have told us, be it also 
“reasons”, experiences, or simply the result of their habits?  There are endless arguments we may 
here take as important, in dealing with brands or “the aesthetic”, and it seems that, in both fields, 
the more we know the more we see, and the more we see the more we know …  
 
 73 
Thus, we simultaneously “know” in many senses, but we do not in many others, which is a curious 
situation. Our innate symbolisation capacity binds together endless, and different, fragments of 
knowledge, collected everywhere and unified under such concepts, and that allow us to use it, and 
enjoy it in practice, automatically, many times without even knowing why.  
Connecting such concepts was then, and still is, an hard task, implying serious constrains 
concerning concept(s) definition, its frame, acceptable indicators, its depth, and so on. Fortunately, 
however, the opportunity of dealing with a case study has “simplified” our task, in allowing us to 
translate these questions to a practical situation: a “by SIZA” brand in the furniture design field e.g., 
a situation where brands and aesthetics could “intercept”.      
As our case study implied a “producer” perspective e.g., a contribution to the brand development, 
we started assuming “market orientation” as a powerful mechanism, and philosophy, inside the 
marketing discipline; therefore, in our starting perspective, we considered that previously knowing 
what people like, before undertaking further marketing actions, was crucial. It clearly was a very 
simple “version” of such mechanism, or philosophy, of course, but it allowed us to deal with our 
questions.     
Proceeding through a review of brands and aesthetics literature, we quickly arrived to the fact that 
both the fields are enormously complex and diffuse, usually involving high abstraction levels 
sometimes hardly translatable to practice, and even “irreconcilable” assumptions. Perhaps worst, 
some of the latter are often difficult to clarify, hidden behind complex and/or stereotyped 
speeches. Even so, we draw from it our next conclusions: we took brands as a consistent difference 
found on consumers’ judgements, about a given product, and “the aesthetic” as an affective 
component of brands. These are not full definitions, of course; they only simplify many possible 
approaches. Still, they seem to be at the core of most existent literature, though not always 
explicitly.     
As a corollary, we expected “the aesthetic” would also show differences the moment we face a 
brand, assuming we could fairly know, or at least simulate an adequate context. 
Thus, a survey would conciliate these questions: it would allow us to search for relations between 
brands and aesthetics, simultaneously giving us some support in our study of possible markets to 
the brand.    
Our starting perspective was, also, one where visual stimuli (and culture) dominate contemporary 
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society, where marketing actions widely appeal to aesthetic arguments, and where individuals seem 
to be different concerning the emphasis they give to both e.g., to brands and aesthetics. As we also 
share the view that these differences probably result from biologic factors, personal development, 
social influence, or even random historical conditions, to say the least e.g., from an exceedingly 
number of factors, the sole stable presuppose was, precisely, the existence of such differences. 
Moreover, and perhaps because of that too, we were sceptical concerning the human ability of 
accurately translating – through simple words applied by everybody – the process of living such 
complex phenomena. As a conclusion, then, we thought that indirect measures, just focused on 
peoples’ capacity of quantifying their own experience, were preferable.  
Consequently, methodology should be flexible, in order to adjust itself to (expected) dispersion in 
subjects’ opinion, but powerful so that it could (reliably) “squeeze” information from available data. 
As both in “the aesthetic”, and in brands, we were equally emphasising phenomenon and context, our 
basic choices were a Likert scale, and Friedman tests, to measure phenomena, together with an MDS 
algorithm (ALSCAL_4) and an experimental condition, to measure associated contexts. In addition, 
we also used some other procedures to analyse, and relate them all: Factor Analysis and Categorical 
Regression with Optimal Scaling (CATREG).  
A Likert scale is appropriate to “one-dimensional” situations, as it was our option concerning the 
use of a “proxy” variable (Affect) to measure “the aesthetic” phenomenon. Non-parametric tests like 
the Friedman test, in turn, are appropriate to situations where we want to compare two groups of 
people, using the distribution(s) of a single and ordinal variable (Affect) e.g., to measure a difference 
between groups (a phenomenon) like the one that brands usually involve.   
Regarding contexts, ALSCAL is suitable to “multidimensional” situations e.g., situations where we 
(may possibly) need several criteria to adequately build a “picture” of it, as it was here the case with 
Perception (“the aesthetic” immediate context). An experimental condition, in turn, providing 
different information to subjects, would simulate the usual context of brands: the role of marketing 
actions.     
Finally, we established summary relations between phenomena and contexts, using a CATREG 
procedure, under the goal of an exploratory approach.  
In general, previous assumptions were fairly efficient, and led to interesting results, though some 
questions deserve further improvement, of course:   
 
 75 
- Sample was as a non-probability one, and of smaller size than planned too, therefore 
introducing important limitations: we must look at results with prudence, and we certainly 
cannot extrapolate it. As an exploratory attempt, however, it has led to a valid experience that 
we can easily expand, in the future, into a full-scale survey.      
 
- As expected, all items of our Likert scale apparently led to a consistent measure of a single 
concept, Affect, even considering that one of these items could introduce complications. In 
fact, respondents could interpret our third item (“I wish I had one of these furniture pieces in my home”) 
as a “buying intention” question, thus distorting their answers; however, it appears they did not, 
considering Factor Analysis results. Consistently, when we experimentally rebuilt our Affect 
measure using only two items, and repeated subsequent computations too, results have not 
changed at all. Even so, we only took Affect as an interval measure inside Descriptive Statistics; 
beyond it, we assumed a stricter assumption on human quantifying capacities, and took Affect 
as ordinal. 
 
- Our “aesthetic context”, Perception, as described by ALSCAL, was steadier that expected 
among all individuals, and it led to a curious pattern that was reasonably stable among 
sub-samples, namely if we also account for their size. Our conclusion was, therefore, that 
people were not so different as we initially thought they would, a question that certainly 
deserves further research. Surely, these kinds of algorithms always give a solution, assuming we 
provide an adequate input; however, results could be far more complex then they were, as what 
would happen if, for instance, we needed more than two stimuli to define a dimension, or more 
than a single dimension to interpret a stimulus, too. Even so, we may devise some 
improvements: 
 
a) On one side, the number and quality of stimuli, its consistency “intra” and “inter” design 
styles, the market relevance of a stimulus, and a higher number of respondents can lead, 
probably, to much better results. In addition, a more accurate algorithm (as we expect 
SMACOF will be), an adequate consideration of subjects’ criteria when answering each step 
of the questionnaire, or even comparing results given by different algorithms, may 




b) On another side, however, we can see ALSCAL as a “lens mechanism”, through which we 
analyse consumers. If we “zoom in” too much e.g., if we restrict ourselves to a limited set 
of stimuli, we will only capture details, probably; if, instead, we “zoom out” in excess e.g., if 
we consider to many stimuli, we will solely capture broad tendencies. Consequently, only a 
chain of attempts will most likely lead to effective results. 
 
- Connecting, thereafter, our aesthetic measure (Affect) with its immediate context (Perception), 
through a previous CATREG procedure, we did found such connection as helpful, indeed, in 
exploring subjects’ experiences as translated by survey. Attempting to summarise, here, the 
broader pattern we found, we can say that (Figure 20): 
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a) Both the Classical (high formalism and/or “old look”, like Mackintosh or Aalto) and the 
New (innovative forms and materials or technological “look”, like Arad or Citterio) were 
mostly associated with higher aesthetic experiences. 
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b) By contrast, either the Casual (informal, simplified, or “pop”, like Lovegrove or Stark) or 
the Current (affordable or a sense of “common place”, like Siza or Gerhy) were associated 
with lower ones.     
 
Names itself are clearly subjective, of course. In addition, and from a marketing research 
perspective, as long as the researcher stays coherent, the moment he will develop further 
actions, relative or “exact” interpretations will probably lead to the same results, at all. 
Moreover, correlations between Affect and Perception were lower than we (somehow) 
expected, thus suggesting us caution on the kind of conclusions we draw.     
 
- Finally, we took our brand measure as a difference on subjects’ Affect, tied to different knowledge 
contexts. 
At the research beginning, we were somehow concerned with the nature of such knowledge, 
because we could equally emphasise the Awareness importance on it, the role of Associations 
involved, the kind of “speech” eventually built around each of the authors, or even plenty of 
other questions, too. Ultimately, all these components translate (or result in) a difference, on 
subject’s knowledge, which is characteristic of brands. Still, even knowing the importance of 
such “symptoms” to effectively deal with brands, our concern has shifted to a basic and 
perhaps more important question: the previous identification of its joint effect, before 
undertaking further marketing actions. 
In particular, we wanted to know if the actual Image of each author, understood as a whole 
effect on consumers eventually already existent, also implied on subjects a different aesthetic 
behaviour. Consequently, we defined two groups of people with a specific difference in 
questionnaires – the knowledge, or not, of designers names – and compared correspondent 
answers.    
Broadly, Affect somehow “grew up” from subjects that did not know the designers to those 
that, in fact, could knew it, but we became surprised with the lack of such pattern on Siza, 
particularly among Portuguese individuals. Using Friedman tests thereafter, to confront the 
distribution of answers given by each of these groups, we found out that a wider knowledge 
was, indeed, associated with some improbable Affect variations. Thus, “the aesthetic” may 
probably reflect brands, too.       
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